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History

From Solid Shot to Tomahawk: The Development of American Naval Policy from the
Early Republic to the Present ^ 1 3 pp.)
Director: Dr. Paul G. Lauren
Present American naval policy is the result o f over two centuries development. It is
important to understand that naval policy developed in relation to four themes. These four
themes are domestic politics, international relations, technology, and economic change.
In the early nineteenth century, political considerations, both domestic and international,
resulted in a small navy designed to guard the coast or raid enemy commerce. As the
century progressed, the navy grew in size and capability. The political realities o f the
1880's placed a new importance upon the navy. Two coasts and new overseas possessions
required a strong modem navy for protection. At the same time, USN Captain A T.
Mahan popularized sea power theory in his book The Influence o f Sea Power Upon
Histoiy ltibQ-1783-

New technologies emerging from the Industrial Revolution brought changes in ship
propulsion and construction. Steam power and iron ship construction changed navW
strategy, and placed new importance on overseas bases for logistical support. The
Industrial Revolution changed the economy from an agrarian base to an industrial
foundation. New markets for American products were sought overseas. This required a
strong navy to protect commerce.
The United States emerged as the dominant naval power during the twentieth century.
After World War II, America had the most powerful navy of any nation. The political
realities of the Cold War forced the navy to remain large and technologically advanced.
Aircraft carriers, atomic weapons, and the nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine
became the backbone o f American naval strategy.
The navy of the future will continue to be important. The world is more unpredictable
with the end of the Cold War, and the navy will be integral to maintaining world peace and
security while upholding American interests.
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Introduction
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the formation o f American naval policy in
relation to four themes. These themes are: domestic politics, international relations,
technological change, and economic change. All are crucial to our understanding o f how
the United States developed the naval policy it has today. Although each o f them had
independent influences on naval policy, it is important to understand that it is the
combined influence o f these themes which bears the responsibility for creating the navy we
have.
The role of domestic politics is fundamental to our understanding o f American
naval policy. Historically, the navy has not been viewed by the majority of the public as
important. Sectionalism, party affiliation, and economic class among other factors
aflected public views of the navy and its role. Navies are expensive to build and maintain.
People living in coastal areas, whose livelihoods are dependent upon the sea or commerce,
generally supported the navy. People living in the interior who had less interest in the sea
usually viewed the navy as an unnecessary expense. Only at the beginning of the twentieth
century did the general public really take an interest in naval affairs. As the economy
changed, Americans o f all classes and regions had a stake in commerce carried over the
sea. Therefore they were more villing to spend money on the navy.
America’s view of its own place in the world has influenced its naval policy. Over
the past two and one quarter centuries, America’s self- perceived role in the international
community has changed. The United States has historically been an isolationist country,
sitting behind the insulating comfort o f two great oceans. This tendency to stay aloof fi'om
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world events guided naval policy, particularly throughout the majority o f the nineteenth
century. The navy remained relatively small and slow to grow. By the end o f the
nineteenth century, America’s position on two oceans and new commercial interests
abroad created new interest in the navy. In one hundred years, there was a shift fi'om a
fear o f having a powerful navy that may coerce a war with a European power, to a ready
willingness to challenge European supremacy on the seas o f the world.
Technological changes influenced naval policy. Industrialism during the nineteenth
century led to innovations such as steam power and ironclading. In turn these
technological advances caused changes in naval policy. Steam ships changed naval tactics
and required dedicated overseas bases for support. The invention o f the airplane in the
twentieth century had a similar effect. With greater striking range and power, the aircraft
carrier replaced the battleship as the pre-eminent capital ship. The addition o f nuclear
power, atomic weapons, and the ballistic missile submarine made the navy an important
part o f American nuclear strategy during the Cold War.
The shifts in the American economy jfrom agrarian, through industrial, to the
present information based economy also affected naval policy. During the years o f the
Early Republic (1789-ca. 1820), the United States had a small navy composed of wooden
vessels. The development of an industrial economy led to the adoption of steam power,
ironclading, and eventually ships made completely o f steel. The information economy has
brought precision guided munitions into the naval inventory. Each of these shifts in the
economic foundations o f the country has caused not only technological change, but
questions concerning tactics, fleet composition, and the role o f the navy. Economic

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

evolution has also made the navy more important with each generation as the United
States has ever expanding commercial interests.
In the 210 years from the ratification o f the Constitution to the present, the naval
policy o f the United States has undergone significant changes. The navy has progressed
from a small fleet of coastal defense vessels to the most powerful naval force the world
has ever known. It is capable o f projecting nulitary power anywhere in the world. The
task o f this thesis is to give an overview o f this progression from solid shot to Tomahawk
missiles and to discuss the transformation through each period. It will be shown that naval
policy does not develop in a vacuum, but that it is influenced by domestic and international
politics, economics, and technology, all tempered by the historical experience and
personalities o f each time period.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Chapter 1: Command of the Sea
The Concept of Sea Power
The role o f a navy is twofold: sea control and power projection. Since World War

n, the United States has become the world’s leading naval power with the ability to gain
control of the sea and project power to any part o f the globe. Sea power has always been
integral to maintaining interests world wide. In the past, most o f the world’s great powers
have exercised control o f the sea (with perhaps the exception o f the Mongols). The
Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, French, and British all took turns as the leading sea power of
their time. Even the Romans, considered a land power, needed control o f the sea in order
to expand.
It is not surprising that the United States became a sea power. Given America’s
geographical position and economic potential, sea power is a natural extension o f
American foreign policy. The United States has been blessed with weak neighbors to the
north and south which provide it with security from a nearby threat. With respect to
themportance geography plays, USN Captain Alfred T. Mahan wrote in his famous book.
The Influence o f Sea Power Upon History. “It may be pointed out, in the first place, that if
a nation be so situated that it is neither forced to defend itself by land nor induced to seek
extension o f its territory by way o f the land, it has, by the very unity of its aim directed
upon the sea, an advantage as compared with a people whose boundaries is continental.”^
Weak neighbors combined with geographical isolation from the political and economic

* A T. Mahan, The Influence o f Sea Power Upon Histoiy 1660-1783 (Boston: Little,
Brown, and Company, 1894), p. 29.
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power centers of the world, and a historical distrust o f standing armies, has led the United
States to rely on sea power as a chief means o f power projection.
The modem United States Navy is a product of histoiy, resources, technology, and
politics which have all worked together to produce the most powerftil and effective navy
the world has ever seen. The history o f naval development, which would culminate with
the US Navy, dates back to antiquity and the development of civilization during the
agricultural revolution five to ten thousand years ago.
Water covers more than seventy percent o f the Earth’s surface. Civilization
requires water for life, agriculture, and trade. Therefore, it should be o f no surprise that
the first civilizations grew up around navigable rivers which also provided fertile flood
plains. Civilization quickly sprang up around the Mediterranean Basin, and unsurprisingly,
these civilizations, —Minoan, Greek, Phoenician, and Roman —would prosper based
upon the trade provided by the sea.
The seas and oceans of the world are highways which have historically facilitated
trade and the exchange of ideas between cultures. Most civilizations have found it easier,
cheaper, and faster to trade via water routes than over land. Therefore, as trade increased
between peoples, and the amount of wealth carried on ships also increased, the need for
navies arose. The primary function of early navies was to patrol sea lanes and protect
one’s own shipping, and thereby establish what is called “command o f the sea.” This fact
makes command of the sea important. À state that controls the sea or exercises sea power
is known as a “thallasocracy”. Command o f the sea means that a nation has enough power
afloat to impose its will on the trade routes and the coastal areas where it operates. This
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means that one’s opposition cannot operate successfully without permission. The sea is
eflFectively denied to the enemy and one can operate with impunity. Thus, a thallasocracy’s
commercial interests will also prosper relative to its competitors.
The United States has always been interested in protecting her exports, much more
so than in securing imports. Maritime historians Robert Albion and Jennie Pope w rote,
our interest and our wartime worries have centered in outgoing rather than
incoming cargoes. Except in the Revolution, American cargoes have been
of greater importance from the stratège standpoint, to Europe than its
cargoes have been to us. This has become even more true in the twentieth
century —when our gigantic American industry has produced the military
supplies vitally needed overseas —than it was in the simpler and more selfsufficient days. In the two World Wars, our munitions and also our food
supplies were indispensable to Britain and its allies. At times between 1793
and 1813, our grain was important to France and to England also, but not in
the same degree. In 1812 and in the Civil War, the American industrial
development was sufficient to sustain military operations without munitions
from overseas.^
In her essay “Mahan: Evangelist of Sea Power" which appears in Makers of
Modem Strategy, scholar Margaret Sprout says o f Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan and his
pioneering book, “No other single person has so directly and profoundly influenced the
theory of sea power and naval strategy as Alfred Thayer Mahan.”^ The Influence of Sea
Power Upon KTistory 1660 - 1783 is perhaps the most significant work ever written on sea
power and its importance. Published in 1894, Captain Mahan’s study revolutionized
thinking in terms o f sea power and naval strategy. The book is primarily an analysis of the

^ Robert G. Albion, and Jennie B. Pope, Sea Lanes in Wartime: The American Experience
1775-1945. second edition (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1968), pp. 16-17.
^ Margaret Sprout, “Mahan: Evangelist of Sea Power,” in Edward Mead Earle (ed ).
Makers of Modem Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), p. 415.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

10
use o f sea power by the British in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. According to
historian Robert K. Massie it “codified the Briton’s intuitive sense o f the relationship
between sea power, prosperity, and greatness.”* As a work o f military strategy and history,
The Influence o f Sea Power Upon History is the naval equivalent of Sun Tzu’s Thg AQjpf
and Karl von Clausevntz’s Vom Krieg. In Mahan on Sea Power. William Livezey
states.
In his very first lectures which dealt with the vital, natural, and human
elements or conditions affecting sea power, fi'om which were deduced
certain relationships between prosperity at home, overseas trade and
shipping, naval power, and colonial bases, Mahan continuously bore in mind
the contemporary American situation. So firequently was the picture o f his
own country brought to the fore that one would have been safe in
concluding, even if Mahan had not definitely stated it himself, that the whole
analysis was merely an introductory historical background on which to
sketch the real portrait.®
Although Mahan was so influential, his work was far fi'om perfect. Sometimes he
tended toward oversimplification, generalization, and vague definitions. Also, according
to some naval historians, “his theories were too often accepted uncritically”* by his
contemporaries and popularizes. Nevertheless, no other book has had the influence on
modem naval doctrine than Mahan’s. Historian Paul M. Kennedy states, “Written to
stimulate American interest in a larger fleet, this widely-read and oft-quoted book became

* Robert K. Massie, Dreadnought: Britain. Germanv. and the Coming of the Great War
(New York: Random House, 1991), p. xxi.
®William E. Livezey, Mahan on Sea Power (Norman; University o f Oklahoma Press,
1981), p. 84.
* Clark G. Reynolds, Command o f the Sea (New York: William Morrow & Company,
1974), p. 414.
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the bible o f navaUsts everywhere, particularly in Britain, where its author was feted and
revered.”’ Therefore, it is to Mahan we turn when introducing concepts o f sea power and
how it is achieved.

Mahan s Six Elements of Sea Power
According historian George T Davis, Mahan believed “the mzunspring o f empires
in the past lay in control o f the sea. The loss o f such power was accompanied by decay,
and only by control of the sea could a nation grow healthy and strong.”' To Mahan, there
are six elements which a nation must possess if it is to become a successful sea power and
establish command o f the sea. These elements are: geographical position, physical
conformation, extent of territory, number o f population, character of the people, and
character of the government.®
The first element of sea power, geographical position, refers to the position o f a
nation vis-à-vis the sea and its neighbors. Mahan believed that if a nation is not required to
defend itself or expand itself territorially by land, it will turn to the sea for these purposes."
Mahan holds up England as a perfect example. England is insulated by the English Channel
and the North Sea firom its neighbors. Therefore, it is forced to go to sea in order to
expand and also to protect itself fi^om invarion.

’ Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Masterv (New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1976), p. 182.
' George T. Davis. A N aw Second to None: The Development o f Modem American
Naval Policv (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1940), p. 73.
®Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon Historv. p. 29.
"Ibid.
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The second element o f sea power crucial to Mahan’s thesis is physical
conformation. Regarding this feature, Margaret Sprout writes,
Physical configuration of the national domain determines in large measure
the disposition o f a people to seek and achieve sea power. The character o f
the coastline governs accessibility to the sea; good harbors imply potential
strength; the character o f the soil may van people away from the sea or
drive them to it for a livelihood."
The coastline is a frontier. Because the extension o f the fi*ontier is so important. Sprout
says, “to any nation with a coastline, the sea is a fi'ontier, and national power will largely be
determined by the manner in which it extends that frontier.”" Mahan states.
The seaboard of a country is one o f its fi-ontiers; and the easier the access
offered by the fi'ontier to the regon beyond, in this case the sea, the greater
will be the tendency of a people toward intercourse with the rest of the
world by it. If a country can be imagined having a long seaboard, but
entirely vdthout a harbor, such a country can have no sea trade o f its own,
no shipping, no navy."
Mahan relates climate and productivity to the physical conformation necessary for a
sea power. A nation with a climate which can produce a rich agricultural surplus to meet
all the needs of its inhabitants will not take to the sea with as much enthusiasm as a nation
where the climate is harsher and is therefore less productive. The less productive nation is
more dependent on trade to meet all its needs than the more productive nation. Therefore,
nations such as England and Holland were driven to the sea to make up for the lack of
suflBcient agricultural goods, while France could produce all the food it needed and

" Sprout, “Mahan”, p. 418.
" Ibid.
" Mahan, The Influence o f Sea Power Upon Historv. p. 35.
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therefore was not as dependent upon the sea for its needs. This relationship helps explain
vdiy Britain and the Low Countries became the first centers o f manufacture, producing
something valuable to trade with other more agriculturally productive nations such as
France.
At the time Mahan wrote his book, he considered the United States a nation like
France which could produce all it needed. He stated,
Except Alaska, the United States has no outlying possession, - no foot of
ground inaccessible by land. Its contour is such as to present few points
specially weak from their saliency, and all important parts of the frontiers
can be readily attained, - cheaply by water, rapidly by rail. The weakest
fi’ontier, the Pacific, is far removed from the most dangerous o f possible
enemies. The internal resources are boundless as compared with our
present needs . . . Yet should that little comer be invaded by a new
commercial route through the Isthmus, the United States in her turn may
have the rude awakening o f those who have abandoned their share in the
common birthright of all people, the sea.*^
Mahan was anticipating a very real future concern which would take America in a
new direction vnth reference to meeting its security needs. At this time, the United States
was effectively a land power like France, Germany, and Russia. Mahan’s warning would
be heeded once the Panama Canal was constructed. The canal was vulnerable, creating a
new security problem for the United States which would drive it by necessity to acquire
other bases abroad, for protection, particularly the Hawaiian Islands and Cuba.^^
The third element of sea power in Mahan’s thesis concerns extent of territory. This
is the last o f the physical or geographical requirements that Mahan postulates for a sea

Ibid., p. 42.
Harold & Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power 1776-1918 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1944), pp. 214-15.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

14
power. What Mahan means by extent of territory does not refer to the size o f the nation in
terms of land area. Rather, he is referring to the “length o f its coast-line, and the character
o f its harbors that are to be considered."'^ Mahan’s postulation here is that the length of
the coast and quality o f the harbors can be either “a source o f strength or weakness”
depending upon the size o f the population relative to the size o f the coastline. If a nation
with a large coastline and many suitable harbors has a relatively small population, then that
nation has a weakness. It does not have the population necessary to take advantage of
what would be a source o f immense strength. Mahan points to this as one o f the sources of
Southern defeat in the Civil War. Although the South had an extensive coast and excellent
harbors, it did not have the population to successfully defend them.
This relationship then of extent of territory to population leads into Mahan’s fourth
element; population. Mahan states,
It has been said that in respect o f dimensions it is not merely the number of
square miles, but the extent and character o f the sea coast that is to be
considered with reference to sea power; and so, in point o f population, it is
not only the grand total, but the number following the sea, or at least readily
available for employment on ship-board and for the creation o f naval
material, that must be counted.*’
According to Mahan, a nation must have the population resources necessary to provide
personnel for a navy, and reserve personnel available for supplying the logistical and other
material needs of the navy. This population must be in excess o f what is necessary for the
other functions of society and in approximate locale to the sea. Mahan points out that the

Mahan, The Influence o f Sea Power Upon Historv. p. 43.
*’ Ibid., pp. 44-45.
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United States at the time had scarcely the population resource necessary to meet her needs
in terms of merchant shipping and its related industries. He despaired even for the
possibility o f a labor reserve which would provide for the pro\âsioning o f a strong navy.
He believed that the only way for the United States to meet those needs was by
strengthening the commerce of the country as a whole." Indeed, events at the close o f the
nineteenth century would prove fortuitous in that matter as several major economic
downturns, especially the depression of 1893, would provide the necessary excuses for
extending commerce. The United States was hit by overproduction and needed markets
with which to trade in order to eliminate gross surpluses o f manufactured and even
agricultural goods.
The fifth element in Captain Mahan’s thesis on the elements of sea power concerns
the more subjective, but nevertheless critical, factor of the character o f the people or the
national character. He believes that the character o f the general population will affect
whether or not it is suitable for commerce, and therefore sea power. Mahan says,
If sea power be really based upon a peaceful and extensive commerce,
aptitude for commercial pursuits must be a distinguishing feature of the
nations that have at one time or another been great upon the sea. History
almost without exception afiSrms that this is true. Save the Romans, there is
no marked instance to the contrary.
He goes on to say, “All men seek gain and, more or less love money; but the way in which
gain is sought vdll have a marked effect upon the commercial fortunes and the people
inhabiting the country,”"

" Ibid., p. 49.
"Ibid., p. 50.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

16
This last statement is of utmost importance. Long-term success on the sea, and
therefore long-term success as a commercial power is dependent upon the manner in which
a nation approaches commerce. Mahan points to Spain and Portugal as examples o f the
wrong way to approach a healthy commerce. It is Mahan’s opinion that Spain and
Portugal were interested in gaining wealth by the sword. They desired only gold and silver
from their colonies. Accordingly, they were not concerned with long-term building and
investment to take advantage o f the discovery of the new world. Spain continued to be a
power on the sea, but Mahan points out that after the Battle o f Lepanto in 1571, Spain
began a long slow slide into decay as a naval and commercial power.^ The Dutch and
English, on the other hand, according to Mahan, took a different, and in the long term, a
more successful and prosperous route. They had greater patience than the Spaniards and
the Portuguese. As Mahan points out.
They were no less bold, no less enterprising, no less patient. Indeed, they
were more patient, in that they sought riches not by the sword but by labor,
which is the reproach meant to be implied by the epithet; for thus they took
the longest, instead of what seemed to be the shortest road to wealth. But
these two peoples, radically o f the same race had other qualities, no less
important than those just named, which combined their surroundings to
favor their development by the sea. They were by nature business-men,
traders, producers, negotiators. Therefore both in their native country and
abroad . . . they everywhere strove to draw out all the resources of the land,
to develop and increase them.^*
According to Mahan, the British and the Dutch took the long road to wealth through
investment and risk o f capital in order to secure greater gains in the long run.

“ Ibid.
Ibid., p. 52.
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The lesson that Mahan gives us is that a people which have a national stake in the
long term success o f an enterprise and work diligently to make it work will retain its power
upon the sea in order to keep that investment and interest secure and growing. This is one
place where Mahan believed that Americans had great aptitude.^
The sixth and final element to sea power is what he described as the “character of
the government.” Mahan stated.
The various traits of a country and its people which have so far been
considered constitute the natural characteristics with which a nation, like a
man, begins its career; the conduct o f the government in turn corresponds to
the exercise of the intelligent will-power, which, according as it is wise,
energetic and persevering, or the reverse, causes success or failure in a
man’s life or a nation’s history.^
The lesson here is that a government’s character greatly affects commerce, and therefore
sea power. Margaret Sprout points out in her essay that it was Mahan’s belief that,
British policy since the reign o f James I has been determined to assert and
maintain colonial, commercial, and naval supremacy and to adopt all
measures necessary thereto. This adherence to a single line o f policy was
easier, Mahan believed, because the government o f Britan lay in the hands
of a single class —the landed aristocracy.^
She points out that Mahan’s generalization here is o f doubtful merit. She says,
“More recent research would cast doubt upon Mahan’s historical generalizations
concerning the influence o f the landed aristocracy and would place more emphasis upon the

^ Ibid., p. 58.
^Ibid.
24

M. Sprout, “Mahan,” p. 420.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

18
rising commercial classes.”^ Mahan should have recognized that from about 1670 onward,
the interests of the merchant classes represented by parliament gained more political power
in Britain. This coincided with the ascendency of British naval power through the
eighteenth century. However, just because Mahan’s generalization with regard to the
landed aristocracy is flawed, it does not mean that the general axiom is flawed. For
example, Spain was a nation ruled by nobility where the interests of the merchant class
took a back seat. The character o f that government and the manner in which it sought
wealth determined that its power upon the seas would be comparatively short lived.
Britain, on the other hand, (taking into account Mahan’s flawed analysis on this point) had
a government in which the interests o f the merchant classes were represented. Therefore
the government had a stake in promoting and protecting commerce, not just treasure ships.
The character o f the government of Britain and The Netherlands determined that they
would have a real interest and investment upon the seas, and would maintain the power to
protect that investment. In point o f fact, it was competition with the English which forced
the decline of Dutch sea power in the late seventeenth century.
These are the six elements which make sea power according to Mahan. To
summarize briefly, in order to become a sea power, a nation must have a good position
geographically. There must be suitable geography and climate necessary to produce
dependence upon and acceptance of the sea. It must have a fairly large extent of coastline
and good harbors with the population necessary to take advantage o f it. The nation must
have a population of suitable size and inclination to take to the sea and support related

2*Ibid.
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industries. The people must have a national character which places value in diligence and
commercial enterprise. Lastly, a nation must have a government which consistently
supports and encourages commerce in the interest o f the individual and also the nation as a
whole. These are the six elements which in his mind will determine a nation’s proclivity for
sea power.

Applications of Sea Power
Command of the sea can only be secured if both tactical and strategic dimensions
are obtained first. Tactical command o f the sea can be won by defeating one’s adversary in
a naval battle. Strategic command o f the sea can be acquired by interrupting an adversary’s
lines of communication so as to deny them needed supplies and information. This includes
commerce raiding (guerre de course) and the destruction o f ships carrying logistical
supplies.
Command o f the sea is strategic in nature. Noted naval historian Clark Reynolds
addresses the strategic application of naval power in his own book Command of the Sea.
He says,
. . . for maritime nations, the navy has been the main strategic arm of a
nation’s defensive structure, dominating the defensive policies of the home
government, maintmning a generally offensive stance, and operating mainly
on the “blue water” o f the high seas.“
Therefore, the navy of a maritime nation has several functions which are aimed at
gaining command of the sea. The first function, Reynolds argues, is to “maintain a superior
fighting fleet either a) to seize command of the sea, or b) to deter an enemy fi'om
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attempting to control the sea.”^’ All naval operations then, are directed at depriving and
denying the enemy the benefits of sea control. The fleet is used actively to maintain or gain
control over any waters in dispute. Tactical victory at sea is one method of achieving
strategic command of the sea, and is gained by defeating the enemy fleet in battle. This is
the goal of fleet actions and other actions between warships. By destroying the warships o f
the adversary, one can prevent the adversary firom projecting power on the ocean and
gaining command of the sea for themselves. The attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese
on December 7, 1941, was designed to eliminate the US Pacific Fleet, thus securing
command of the sea for the Japanese Navy. Unfortunately for them, they failed to get four
carriers which had sailed out o f Pearl the day before, ensuring survival o f valuable fleet
elements. A second example is the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805. The British Fleet under
Admiral Horatio Nelson defeated a combined French and Spanish fleet. This victory,
although resulting in the death o f Nelson, gave the British undisputed command o f the sea
during the rest of the Napoleonic Wars and throughout most of the nineteenth century.
During the Second World War, the naval campaigns by both sides in the Pacific
Theater were designed to achieve strategic command of the sea. The Japanese seized
islands for forward deployment o f forces and to deny the Allies bases fi'om which to launch
attacks on the Home Islands. They also sought to control and secure the shipping lanes to
secure resources fi'om occupied China and colonies seized fi'om the Allies. At the same
time, the Allies began a campaign o f island hopping to remove the Japanese fi'om their
forward bases in order to gmn airfields to strike the Home Islands and bomb them into
27
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submission. (In cases where war does not exist, a naval fleet serves as a deterrent to
aggression from competitors.)
The second and third functions o f a navy are actively defensive to the nation and its
interests. The second frinction o f the navy of a maritime nation, according to Reynolds, is
to defend the nation and its territory against invasions. This requires a navy to neutralize
an enemy fleet or eliminate it. The third function is the protection of seaborne commerce.
This means that the navy is actively engaged in convoy or escort duty, and patrolling the
seas for pirates.
The fourth function o f a navy is to blockade the coast o f an enemy. This is
offensive while the previous two are defensive. The primary purpose of a blockade is to
deny the enemy the ability to trade commercially. Strategic command o f the sea by a navy
can have a tremendous effect on the economic well being o f an adversmy. A navy which
has effective sea control can implement and enforce a blockade or a “maritime exclusion
zone," cutting off trade with the enemy. This can be done for purposes o f coercive
diplomacy or as an act o f strategic warfare. It would rarely if ever be done as an act of
deterrence because a blockade is an extremely aggressive act. The purpose of a blockade
would be to help wreck an enemy’s economy and literally starve him into submission. The
blockade also functions to prevent the enemy naval fleet from operating effectively.
Blockades may be direct or indirect. A direct blockade involves overt moves by the navy
to prevent commerce from flowing on the part of the enemy. An indirect blockade is done
by “observing and thwarting enemy ship movements from a considerable distance away.”^*

^ Ibid., p. 13.
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Functions five and six concern assaults on an enemy’s territory. The fifth function
o f a navy is to engage in combined operations with other branches o f the military. This
includes sea lift of ground troops and supplies, supporting an invasion through amphibious
assault, and maintaining the lines o f communication.^ The sixth and final function o f a
maritime power’s navy is to provide strategic bombardment. The navy must be able to
project power inland. This can be done in a number of ways, fi'om the use o f conventional
artillery to cruise missiles for ship-to-shore attacks or naval aircraft.
Continental powers apply navies in a different manner strategically fi’om maritime
powers. For continental powers, because of the small size o f the navy relative to the large
size o f the army, the navy takes a defensive stance. Therefore according to Reynolds, the
navy o f a continental power has four functions.
The first function is to defend the country against invasion. The navy augments
coastal defense positions in attempting to repel the invading fleet firom coastal waters. It
also protects harbors, rivers and other bodies of water which may be used by the enemy to
gain access for invasion."
The second purpose o f a continental navy is to engage in combined operations to
support the army, which is the main fighting force of a continental power. A continental
navy may ferry troops and supplies. It may support overland operations to capture an
enemy port. The navy may also engage in small scale amphibious assaults and give

^Ibid.
" Ibid., p. 14
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supporting firepower to land units operating in range o f naval weaponry/'
The third function o f a continental navy is commerce raiding. The navy will engage
in guerre de course in order to disrupt the maritime supply line o f an enemy. This was the
goal of the Kriegsmarim o f the Third Reich. The German navy conducted unrestricted
submarine warfare during the First and Second World Wars in order to deny much needed
supplies to the British. The purpose was to starve them into submission, and take the
island nation out o f the war by wrecking its economy and its ability to conduct war on land
and sea. The navy may also engage in counter blockade operations in order to break a
blockade imposed by an enemy navy to restore over sea conunerce.
The fourth and final function o f a continental navy, according to Reynolds, is to
“maintain an efficient second-class fighting fleet either a) to restrict enemy offensive action,
or b) to deter an enemy fi'om attempting to dominate local waters.”^^ The continental navy
acts as a deterrent in this case simply by existing. By maintaining an efficient fleet-in-being,
a continental power can provide an effective deterrent to possible aggression by a maritime
power.
Besides the question o f the role of a navy with regards to maritime and continental
powers, there is the question o f the role a navy plays for a small power. According to
Reynolds, a small power has only three tasks. The first of these is to defend the country
against invasion. This is usually done by coastal patrol craft and shore installations,
augmented by the army and air force. The second fiinction is to police the local waters for
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pirates or enemy ships. Reynolds points out that invariably small powers require the
assistance o f larger allied navies in order to achieve long term success.^^ The third function
is commerce raiding. However, even while engaging in guerre de course a small navy will
need the assistance o f a larger ally to be successful.
Command o f the sea is important in the political and diplomatic arena as well as the
military arena. Command of the sea gives a maritime nation an important tool or lever in
canying out policy. This is especially effective when the adversary is another maritime
nation or is in at least some capacity dependent upon the sea. Command of the sea may not
have much of an effect on a land-locked nation. Because the sea permits an avenue for the
projection o f power, several political options are left open to a sea power. Depending
upon the circumstances, these are deterrence and coercive diplomacy.
The purpose o f deterrence, of course, is to stop aggression or prevent some other
threatening action before it happens. Sea power and command of the sea can be a great
asset to deterrence and many deterrent options may be exercised depending upon the
situation. A sea power can place a fleet off the shores of a potential adversary as a
potential threat o f a blockade, shelling, or destruction o f commerce if the adversary takes
an action not to one’s liking. An example of this would be the presence of US naval ships
in the Persian Gulf. At the present, one reason they are there is to deter the Iraqi regime
iQ’om making any aggressive moves toward its neighbors.
Another way a navy acts as a deterrent is as a fleet in being. Merely by existing, it
acts as a deterrent. The US Navy during the Cold War is one example. The existence of
33

Ibid., p. 15.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

25
the navy, combined with its strategic potential, acted as one leg o f the American deterrent
to potential Soviet aggression.
Command o f the sea is also an aid to coercive diplomacy. The purpose of coercive
diplomacy is to reverse an action already taken or to prevent any further action regarded as
threatening. A navy which has command o f the sea can be instrumental in this.
Historically, naval forces often have provided more flexibility for coercive diplomacy than
traditional forms o f military force. The naval blockade o f Cuba in 1962, though not the
only instrument of coercive diplomacy, was a key asset in getting the Soviets to back down
and remove the missiles. The US Navy also acted as an instrument of coercive diplomacy
recently in the spring of 1998 when Saddam Hussein closed off sites to United Nations
weapons inspectors. The threat o f air and missile strikes from United States naval forces in
the Persian Gulf forced Saddam to back down and reopen access to United Nations
inspectors.
Summary
In summary, Mahan and Reynolds agree on the importance of sea power to a
nation’s power. Both agree that sea power is important to national interest and world
influence. Where they diverge in our discussion is their individual focus. Mahan focuses
on the criteria which in his mind are prerequisites for a nation to become a maritime power.
These prerequisites are based on three geographical considerations and three socio-cultural
considerations. Mahan’s criteria are relevant to a nation’s ability to develop and sustain sea
power.
Reynolds is concerned with how a nation applies sea power, rather than the
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prerequisites for becoming a sea power. Like Mahan, Reynolds divides his applications o f
sea power into two separate categories. One category concerns the use o f navies by
maritime powers, the second category relates to continental powers.
The concept of command of the sea and sea power is important for our
understanding of the development o f American naval policy. We should keep Mahan’s and
Reynolds’ criteria in mind as we examine the development of American naval policy in light
o f the changes which would take place in technology, economics, domestic politics, and
international relations.
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Chapter IL The Navy and the Eariy Republic
O f the four inter-related themes central to this thesis —technology, economic
change, domestic politics, and international relations —the most important to the
development of naval policy during the years 1794 - 1820 were domestic politics and
international relations. Both shaped policy decisions made in regard to the development of
the navy, the role it would play on the world stage, and the philosophies that would guide it
for nearly a century.
In most cases throughout history, perceptions o f a navy’s role and importance to
the national well-being change. This is true of the relationship between the government of
the United States and the navy over more than two hundred years. From the time o f its
inception in 1775 to the present, the US Navy has gone through many changes in the role it
plays as an arm of foreign policy.

Politics and the Navy
The US Navy was not originally meant to be a blue water navy which would project
American power globally on any large scale. During the years of the Revolution and the
Early Republic, the Navy was primarily viewed as a mechanism for coastal defense and as a
deterrent to aggression by larger naval powers, specifically Britain. Many reasons for this
view existed, but the first and foremost reason was expense. A large navy was considered
to be too expensive to maintain by many leaders of the Early Republic. This was especially
true of the Jeffersonian Party. Thomas Jefferson, recognized the need for some kind of
naval force to repel invasion, but believed that a small force of gunboats would be
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suÉBcient.^ There were others however who believed that a navy capable of blue water
operations was necessary. These individuals tended to be members of the Federalist Party
like Alexander Hamilton, who stated in the Federalist Number XI:
A further resource for influencing the conduct o f European nations towards
us, in this respect, would arise from the establishment of a federal navy.
There can be no doubt that the continuance o f the Union under an efficient
government would put it in our power, at a period not very distant, to
create a navy which, if it could not vie with the great maritime powers,
would at least be o f respectable weight if thrown into the scale o f either two
contending parties.’’
This debate over the size, scope, and role of a navy would extend from the
administration of George Washington until the War of 1812. Even the lessons of the War
o f 1812 would not sway the opinions o f many. This debate can be partially explained
through sectionalism. This sectionalism was not just North and South, but also East and
West. Typically, Westerners, those people living away from the coast whose livelihood
was not dependent upon the sea, opposed a large navy. The majority o f Southerners also
opposed a large navy because they did not deem one beneficial to their interests. It was
primarily the mercantile classes of New England and the Atlantic coast who supported a
large navy to protect their commercial interests. In the South, there were also a few
tidewater plantation owners who could see the benefits that could be derived from
commerce protection by a large navy, but again, these were few.
It is eauy to see then, why views o f the navy would be affected by sectionalism. A

^ Sprout and Sprout, The Rise o f American Naval Power 1776-1918. p. 58
” Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist. Number IX. in Isaac Kramnick, (ed.), James
Madison. Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay: The Federalist Papers (London: Penguin Books
Ltd., 1987), p. 130.
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navy is expensive to maintain, and at the time it was considered by many to be a pork barrel
project. We can understand that New Englanders and those people living in New Yoric
City and Philadelphia would want to have a navy capable of supporting commerce by
patrolling for pirates or hostile adversaries and for convoy duty when necessary. The
inhabitants were dependent on the sea for their economic well being. Whether it was
fishing, whaling, or trade, the northeastern coast o f the United States had a stake in
maintaining a fairly large navy. The rest o f the country on the other hand, did not.
Southerners and Westerners would resist building a navy larger than what was deemed the
necessary minimum for coastal defense. These sectional differences are demonstrative of
Mahan’s second and fifth elements o f sea power; physical conformation and national
character.^ With respect to element two, the physical conformation o f the land in the
northeast and the tidewater south provided an incentive for the locals to have an interest in
maritime affairs. In contrast, the west and the Piedmont south did not have a geography
which corresponded to an interest in the sea. In regards to element five, the character of
the people in coastal areas tied their fortunes to the sea. Maritime commerce was integral
to their prosperity. People living farther inland did not have their fortunes tied to the sea,
and therefore had scant use for a navy. It is this view, perpetuated by Westerners and
Southerners, which would dominate American naval policy fi'om the end of the eighteenth
century and spur debate well through the first quarter o f the nineteenth. Sectionalism is a
prime example o f the role the theme of domestic politics plays in the formation of naval
policy.
36
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The naval policy of the Early Republic was affected strongly by the Jefferson
administration. Historian Craig L. Symonds wrote.
Historians have frequently assumed that Gallatin, Jefferson, and other
opponents o f naval expansion during those critical years were
philosophically opposed to spending any money on a navy. But the fact is
that most of them were not antinavy at all; their concern was that the size
and configuration o f the navy be fully dependent on the national needs, or,
to use a nautical metaphor, they preferred to trim the country's sails to the
winds how and when they blew rather than set storm canvas at once for a
gale that might not come. What they did oppose was the construction o f a
powerful peacetime fleet whose major function would be to serve as an
instrument of political influence.^^
The Republicans did not want a navy which was meant to impress, deter, or carry political
risks which may provoke war.^* Although Jefferson would see that there was some benefit
to be derived from a larger navy, he stayed the course o f supporting a small one. For
Jeffersonians, naval policy rested on maintaining a force suitable for coastal defense. This
coastal defense policy was reliant upon two things. These were harbor fortifications,
includmg shore batteries and a fleet of small maneuverable gunboats to augment these
installations. The theory was that any navy which tried to force these fortifications would
be too heavily damaged to carry out fiirther operations. The Jeffersonians did recognize
the need for a few ocean-going ships. But the numbers o f these ships were very small,
around a half dozen, and they were mostly frigate size like the 44-gun USS Constiiutiotty or
smaller. This small ocean going flotilla would be engaged in guerre de course in time of
war. Constitution and other fiigates and sloops would be used to raid an enemy’s

Craig L. Symonds. Navalists and Antinavalists (Newark: University of Delaware Press,
1980), p. 11.
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commerce.
Unlike the Jeffersonians, the Federalists and later the Whigs of the northeast,
favored a larger navy. Few o f them envisioned a navy the size and power o f Britain and
France. What most of them wanted was a navy capable o f blue water operations, which
was large enough to make any enemy reconsider operating in American waters. Their
theory was that the navy had to be large enough to deter a potential enemy from attacking.
They recognized the fact that it would be logistically impossible for Britain to send a
superior naval force to American waters, and still have enough ships, especially men of
war, to meet other commitments. The Federalist/Whig vision of naval policy was one of
forward deployment. The navy would cruise off the coast of the United States at a fair
distance of several hundred miles and with enough strength to deter an enemy from
assaulting American shores. These commerce minded men also wanted enough ships of
suitable size to be used for convoy duty in the event that it should become necessary. This
necessity occurred during the undeclared naval war with France and also with the troubles
brought by the Barbary Pirates. In the case o f the French, portions of the Jay Treaty
between the US and Britain appeared to be an abrogation o f the Franco-American Alliance
o f 1778. French ships predated upon American shipping. Ambassador James Monroe, a
Francophile who failed to press American claims, was replaced in Paris by Charles
Pinckney. Pinckney was rebuffed by the French government, and the situation deteriorated
creating a quasi war or undeclared conflict with France.’^ With respect to the Barbary
Pirates, it was a simple case of continued piracy which threatened American commerce.
39
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These conilicting interests had the effect o f creating a naval policy and a navy which
was ineffective. Although the navy would have some notable successes under fire during
the War o f 1812, the navy and the policies which guided it proved to be inadequate to meet
the expanding needs of the national defense.
The Federalist Navy
The Federalists had the first opportunity to implement naval policy. During the
administrations of George Washington and John Adams, the Federalists dominated the
political scene. The emergence o f the United States Navy was caused initially by the
depredations o f the Barbary Corsairs. Pirates fi’om the North Afiican States of Morocco,
Algeria, and Tripoli were preying upon American commerce. The Naval Act o f 1794,
passed on March 27, 1794 stated, “Whereas the depredations committed by the Algerine
corsairs on the commerce of the United States render it necessary that a naval force should
be provided for its protection....’*" These pirates had been formeriy held in check by the
Portuguese. However, with the outbreak o f the wars surrounding the French Revolution,
the British arranged a truce between Portugal and Algiers. The Portuguese Navy had been
responrible for suppressing the Algerine Pirates and keeping them to the Mediterranean and
out of the Atlantic.*' The intent of this British action was to permit the Algerians to
venture out o f the Mediterranean to prey upon French shipping in the Atlantic.*^ The

" An Act to Provide a Naval Armament, March 27, 1794, in The Public Statutes at Large
o f the United States of America. 8 Vols., Richard Peters, (ed.) (Boston: Charles C. Little and
James Brown, 1848), I: 350.
Symonds, Navalists and Antinavalists. p. 29.
Sprout & Sprout, l b s Risfi o f Amerip&n N aval E o w sr 17.7^-1918, p. 28.
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Algerians ended up preying on American shipping as well. The Federalists chose to outfit a
naval force to protect American commerce. This decision was not without controversy.
Representatives fi-om rural inland regions attacked the proposal. They believed that it was
better to pay tribute or hire a European navy rather than build a navy which could enhance
the power o f the Federal government and increase the public debt. They also feared that
the presence o f a naval force in European waters could drag the fledgling nation into war.^^
Even agdnst such strong opposition (the Federalists were a minority in the House),
Congress resolved on January 2, 1794, “That a naval force, adequate to the protection of
the commerce o f the United States against the Algerine corsairs, ought to be provided.”^
The Resolution passed narrowly, 46-44. The Naval Act emerged fi^om this resolution,
providing for the construction o f four 44-gun fiigates and two of 36 guns.^*
Federalist naval policy developed out o f the Naval Act of 1794. Instead of buying
ships, the Federalists decided to build them. “The fiigates would be built o f live oak and
red cedar, in all parts where they can be used to advantage,"according to the instructions
fi'om Secretary of War Henry Knox. “These valuable woods afford the United States the
highest advantages in building ships, the durability being estimated at five times that o f the
common white oak. Besides these woods, the best white oak, pitch pine, and locust, are
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directed to be used in the construction.”^ According to Harold and Margaret Sprout, “it
was the avowed mm o f the Administration, that these vessels 'should combine such
qualities o f strength, durability, swiftness o f sailing, and force, as to render them equal, if
not superior, [not merely to Algerian corsairs, but] to any frigate belonging to any o f the
European Powers.

It was this use of high quality materials and the desire to produce

superior ships which resulted in the qualities that gave the USS Constitution the nickname

Old Ironsides.
As with any other government program, the advantages were distributed widely.
The government rented naval yards in sbc different cities, one for each ship. The timber
was cut in the Carolines and Georgia. Cannons and shot were to be produced by firms in
Connecticut, Maryland, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. Sails came from Boston."
According to Alexander Hamilton, such ships would allow the United States to “become
the arbiter o f Europe in America, and be able to incline the balance of European
competitions in this part o f the world as our interests may dictate.”" A 1796 peace
agreement with the Algerians resulted in a delay in the construction program. Legislation
passed on the 20* of April, 1796 permitted the Washington Administration to finish three

"L etter from Secretary of War, Henry Knox to Congress, December 27, 1794, in
American State Papers Naval Affairs. 4 Vols. (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1834), I: 6.
" Ibid.
" Ibid., p. 35.
" Alexander Hamilton, as cited in Allan R. Millet and Peter Maslowski, For the Common
Defense: A Military Historv o f the United States of America (New York: The Free Press, 1994),
p. 100.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

35
o f the ships,"
The undeclared conflict with France gave a new impetus to development o f the
navy . The Federalist Adams Administration was supported by a Federalist majority in both
Houses of Congress. Legislation authorizing the creation of a separate department passed
Congress and the Navy Department was established under a Secretary o f the Navy on April
30, 1798” . This would give the navy a firm institutional support. President Adams named
Benjamin Stoddert, a Federalist from Maryland as the first Secretary o f the Navy.” Under
Stoddert’s leadership, the three fiigates Constellation, President, and Constitution were
finished. They joined a force o f over fifty ships hired by the government from the private
sector. From 1798-1800, the fledgling Navy, supplemented by armed merchantmen and
privateers cruised the Carribean and Western Atlantic and faced only a few French
privateers and cruisers. This was because the heavy ships o f the French Navy, involved in
the Napoleonic Wars, were unable to project power on the sea due to the superior British
Navy which held it in check.”

Jefferson’s Navy
The Federalist Adams Administration was followed by the Democratic-Republican
Jefferson Administration. Jefferson had recognized the necessity o f maintaining a navy. He

so Sprout

and Sprout, The Rise o f American Naval Power, p. 36.

” David M Cooney, A Chronology o f the United States Naw: 1775-1965 (New York:
Franklin Watts, Inc., 1965), p. 18.
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had backed Federalist plans at one time or another. However, Jefferson the President
envisioned a smaller force than the Federalists. Jefferson believed that the nation could
best be defended at least cost with a fleet o f coastal gunboats. In a way, his naval policy
was similar to his view o f the army. Like a militia used for local defense, President
Jefferson wanted a navy designed for coastal defense. It was to be made up of small
vessels, some mounting only one gun, which could cruise up and down the coast, operating
in shallow waters. These coastal vessels would support land fortifications in driving off
invaders. Any sea-going ships that were in the fleet would be o f a small number. These
fiigates like the Constitution^ would be used as commerce raiders. The Jeffersonian
gunboat navy relied h^vily on naval militias supplied by the states for local coastal defense.
Although the last naval acts passed by the Federalist Congress on March 3, 1801 had
appropriated $500,000 for the construction of naval yards, docks, and other items. Charles
Paulin says “a considerable part o f the $ 500,000, the Republicans returned to the treasury
unexpended, and but a very small part was devoted to the improvement o f the yards.”*^
Jefferson put the seven vessels authorized by act of March 3,1801 mothballs or in the
language of the day “laid up in ordinary.” O f all the naval yards which had been
authorized, the only one that attracted Jefferson’s interest was the Washington yard."

The War of 1812
As a result of the Jefferson Administration’s naval policies, James Madison

" Charles Oscar Paulin, Paulin!s History o f Naval Administration] 775-1911: A Collection
o f Articles From the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1968), p.
127.
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inherited a small navy barely fit for coastal defense. It was not large enough to provide
adequate coverage where it was needed. Madison also entered the presidency in a time of
troubles. The War of 1812 arose fi’om several factors. British troops remained garrisoned
in parts o f the "Old North West” (the present Upper Midwest, east of the Mississippi
River) when they were supposed to have left after the region was ceded to the United
States in the Treaty of Paris. This was one factor. The primary factors in the decision of
the United States to declare war on Britain were maritime. The Royal Navy had been
boarding American flagged ships and impressing many of the sailors to serve on British
ships. The British claimed that these men were deserters and could legally be pressed for
service on British ships. However, the British also ended up impressing hundereds of
American citizens. Many Americans were outraged by this.
This impressment o f sailors by the Royal Navy resulted firom a shortage in
manpower. This period was a difficult one for the Royal Navy in terms o f providing
adequate personnel to man their ships. Discipline was harsh, making the atmosphere ripe
for desertion. But Britain was in a war with Napoleonic France and needed men
A second source of hostility resulted from the Orders in Council issued by the
British Cabinet on January 7, 1807. The Orders in Council “forbade vessels to trade
between ports belonging to, or in the occupation of, France or her allies”.^ This was a
response to the Berlin Decree which Napoleon issued on November 21, 1806. The Berlin
Decree had the effect o f “proclaiming Britain in a state of blockade, forbidding all

^ Herbert Richmond, Statesmen and Sea Power (Westport: Greenwood Press, Publishers
1974, Reprint o f 1946 ed ), p. 230.
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commerce with her, declaring ail British commerce good prize and ordering British subjects
to be imprisoned.”®’
The Orders in Council disrupted trade for the Americans. From 1807 to 1812, it
was a source o f fiiction between the United States and Britain. America responded in
December o f 1807 with the Embargo Act forbidding American ships trading in the ports of
the belligerents.®* By the spring of 1812, the British were willing to drop the Orders in
Council if the Americans would drop their own acts against British commerce. The Orders
in Council were eventually repealed because the British needed American supplies,
especially foodstuffs to prosecute the war against France, but it was a week too late. The
United States decided that it would no longer stand for the violation of its neutral rights.
On June 17, 1812, the United States declared war on Great Britain. This was not to be a
popular war, and only a narrow margin in Congress supported the war effort.
The War of 1812 would prove the inadequacies o f Jeffersonian naval policies. If it
were not for the fact that the British Navy was preoccupied for some time with Napoleon,
the outcome o f the war might have been different. As it was, the war was almost
disastrous for the United States, demonstrating severe weakness in its policies regarding
both the army and the navy.
The United States Navy made a good showing for itself during the opening phases
o f the war. American ships won several victories which buoyed the spirit of the public and
did much for the psychological well being and confidence o f the country. It was not to last.

®’ Ibid., p. 228.
®*Ibid., p. 245.
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These early victories were won by the few ships the United States maintained for blue
water sea keeping operations, in single ship-combats in which the American fiigates usually
out gunned their British opponents. The United States captured the H.M.S. Macedonian
on October 25, 1812. The Constitution destroyed the Guerriere on August 9, 1812, and
defeated the Java on December 29.”

Most American vessels were the small coastal

vessels, the legacy o f the Jefferson administration. These ships proved ineffective in
preventing the British fi'om operating up and down the coast. From 1813 onward, the
regular United States Navy would have little success on the high seas. What little success
did occur was at the hands o f American privateers, which were authorized by Congress in
1813. Military historians Millet and Maslowski point out correctly that the Jeffersonian
reliance on small ships was not necessarily unwise. They state.
The reliance on small ships was not ill-founded. The Navy’s primary
responsibility was to protect America’s expanding commerce. No great
nation threatened this trade, but pirates and irregular privateers employing
small, fast ships did. Trying to catch these buccaneers with ships of the line
and frigates was futile."^
The Republicans were trying to meet the most likely threat to American shipping
while maintaining a relatively cheap force that was less o f a danger to republican
institutions. Even so, the navy of Jefferson, although successful against pirates, was not
really suitable for defending against the threat o f a great power. From 1812 onward, the
Jeffersonians would follow Federalist naval policies.

” MSllet and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, p. 111.
«®Ibid., p. 124.
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Summary
Domestic politics and international relations thus strongly affected the naval policy
o f the Early Republic. Domestic politics played a role through the sectional and partisan
opinions of the navy. New England and communities along the east coast were more likely
to support a navy than southerners and westerners. Politically, these people tended to be
Federalists and then Whigs. Mercantile interests and tidewater planters believed a navy to
be important for the protection o f commerce, upon which their livelihoods depended. The
fishing and whaling industries also benefitted fi'om naval protection. Finally, fi'om the
perspective of the coastal population, a navy was important for protecting towns and cities
firom attack.
The agrarian interior areas of the west and south generally opposed the navy.
Politically, these people tended to be Democratic-Republicans and then Democrats. They
generally had little dependence upon sea-borne commerce, and therefore were likely to
\âew the navy as an extravagant or unnecessary experience. Because they lived farther
fi'om the sea, they were unlikely to fear invasion or bombardment of their homes. This lack
of concern gave interior people even less incentive to support the navy.
Because the United States was in its infancy during this period, there were two
different points of view concerning the effect a large navy would have on international
relations. The anti-naval faction believed that a strong navy could possibly antagonize a
larger European Power like Bntmn. Therefore it was in the best interest o f the nation to
maintain a small coastal defense navy, to help protect the harbors and engage in commerce
raiding should a war arise. The pro-navy faction felt that a strong navy would deter
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invasion, since the distance between Europe and America was great enough to present the
enemy with logstical difficulties. Most importantly, a strong navy could meet the enemy as
far fi’om coast as possible, reducing the chance of invasion and damage to coastal cities.
Although domestic politics and international relations continued to influence naval
policy throughout the nineteenth century, the most important changes were brought by the
Industrial Revolution that transformed naval technology. Steam propulsion and armor
changed naval tactics and logistical considerations. Industrialization o f the American
economy resulted in surpluses which required overseas markets. Expanding commerce
required changes in policy and a newer, stronger navy.
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Chapter ID: Naval Policy and the Industrial Revolution
The Industrial Revolution which began in England in the early eighteenth century,
would have a profound effect upon the navies o f the world in the nineteenth century. The
theme of technology and technological advances permitted by industrialism would affect
propulsion, construction, size, and ordnance. These advances included steam propulsion,
ironclading, steel ship construction, heavier breech loading artillery, and the corresponding
improved ordnance. Over the course o f the nineteenth century, these changes would alter
the strategy and tactics o f naval warfare around the world. They would also require
substantial changes in naval policy. The requirements and abilities of the new technologies
necessitated changes in geopolitical thinking and goals.
The Industrial Revolution also brought changes in the American economy. Over
the course of the nineteenth century, the economy moved from an agrarian base to an
increasingly industrial base. This shift impacted naval policy in several ways. The United
States began to produce surplus goods, resulting in an increased desire to find overseas
markets. This in turn led to a renewed interest in the navy. The desire to open new
markets abroad, turned the attention of many American's outward. America's ubiquitous
isolationist sentiment began to dissolve, and interest in a Central American canal and
overseas possessions emerged. A strong navy would be a necessity to protect these new
interests.

Steam Propulsion
The first and most important change brought to navies of the world by the industrial
revolution was a change in ship propulsion. For millennia, ships had used both the wind
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and human strength as sources o f power. By the end of the sixteenth century, wind power
reigned supreme, especially in relation to ships o f war. However, that was to change at the
end o f the eighteenth century with the first successful application of the steam engine to
ship propulsion.
The steam engine was first developed to pump water out of English coal mines.
The steam engine was steadily improved through the eighteenth century by innovators such
as James Watt and Richard Trevethick. By the end of the century, the steam engine had
been improved enough in terms of size, power, and efficiency to be considered for motive
power. The Scotsman William Symington sailed the first mechanically successful
steamship, the Charlotte Dundas in 1802. However, the first successful commercial
application o f steam power to ships came not in Britain but in the United States when
Robert Fulton sæled the Clermont up the Hudson River in 1807.
Fulton soon turned his attention fi'om commercial applications to military. The first
steam powered warship was the Demologos, constructed in 1814 by Robert Fulton for the
defense o f New York Harbor.®* Fulton designed Demologos in a most ingenious manner.
Fulton biographer, John S. Morgan writes,
Fulton borrowed fi'om his ferryboat construction experiences and built her
catamaran style, with a double hull, one hundred and sixty seven feet long,
fiAy-six feet wide, and thirteen feet deep, measuring 2,475 tons - enormous
for that period and a radical departure in warship construction. Anticipating
by years the basic principle o f the iron-clad, he built her sides and deck of
five-foot lumber, which protected a paddle wheel that was also made more

®* Bernard Brodie, Sea Power in the Machine Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1941), pp. 18-19.
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secure in its position between the twin hulls.®

Demologos had the advantage of a higher average speed than most sailing ships.
However, her weakness lay in her seagoing ability. She simply did not have the seakeeping abilities o f a saU-powered warship. As Princeton Professor Bernard Brodie points
out, ''tactically she was a powerful warship, but strategically she could hardly be considered
a naval vessel at all.”® The ship could not function properly on the high seas, and did not
have the range to operate for long periods. This weakness in the Demologos would
prevent the wide adoption of steam propulsion for nearly two decades. Because the nature
of their business involves high risks, navies tend to be conservative institutions when it
comes to adopting new technologies. Naval officers o f the period being concerned with
reliability and familiarity. The inherent weaknesses in the early steam ships meant adoption
would be slow. Steam ships were vulnerable. The paddle wheels could be destroyed by
one shot, and the engines sat fairly high in the boat making them vulnerable as well. Fulton
foresaw this problem and placed the paddle wheels in the center of the ship. He also placed
the engne and boiler low in the hull behind walls five feet thick. She was also armed with
two 100-pound short guns designed to fire submerged at close range. The ship was ahead
of its time. ® Demologos^ was not completed in time to join in the war. By the time of
launch, the war was almost over. Frank M. Bennet, a Passed Assistant En^neer, U.S.N.

® John S, Morgan, Robert Fulton (New York: Mason/Charter, 1977), p. 194.
® Brodie, Sea Power in the machine Age, p. 20.
® Stephen Howaith, To Shining Sea: A Historv o f the United States Navy 1775-1998
(Norman: The University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), p. 120.
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believed that this was an unfortunate circumstance. In his book Steam Navy o f the United
jSîatSS, Bennet argues,
the subsequent performance o f this craft under steam makes it certain that
with her powerftil battery and independence o f wind and tide she would
have been entirely successful over the sailing-ftigates she was built to assail,
her advantage over them being not unlike that possessed by a savage,
tireless wolf attacking a flock o f sheep. Her earlier advent would have
saved us the loss of the President frigate, and thus deprived the enemy of
one o f the very few causes for rejoicing over naval victories that the events
of that war afforded.^*
Although his conjecture was originally made in 1896, Bennet’s theory is a good
one. Given the effect on naval thinking that the action between ihe Monitor and the

Merrimac would have years later, the use of Demologos may have hastened the
development o f the steam powered warship.*® Demologos was not a sleek, fast ship by
any means. Though designated a frigate, she was built more like a fortress. Essentially

Demologos became a formidable floating battery when she entered service.
The application o f steam power to ships like Demologos was revolutionary. This is
especially true when discussing navies. Bernard Brodie said of this revolution.
What did steam power do to naval warfare? It completely revised the
conditions governing naval tactics; it modified the whole geography of
position and distance, thus profoundly affecting strategy; it enhanced the
potential military power of industrialized states; and it injected the allimportant factor o f fuel into the problem of naval supplies, thus affecting the
range of naval fleets and the strategic importance of stations abroad. In
short, the steam warship was the most important development since the
fifteenth century, when the discovery o f tacking inaugurated the era o f the

** Frank M. Bennet, Steam Navy of the United States (Westport: Greenwood Press,
1972), pp 8-9.
**Ibid., p. 9
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sailing ship."
The United States was very slow in adopting steam propulsion and other
technologies compared to European Powers such as Britain and France. It was not until
the 1820's that steam navigation received proper attention from any navy. In 1821 and
1822 respectively, the British purchased ih&Monkey and built the Cornet^ both o f which
were unarmed. They did not acquire armed steam vessels until 1828 when t h ^
commissioned the Active and the Lightning.^ During this long lull in the adoption of
steam by the navies of the world, steam was commercially a success. In 1835, there were
700 steam ships traversing the waters of the United States." Brodie points out that there
were actually several good reasons for the delay in the adoption o f steam power.
According to Brodie,
the machinery of the time was excessively bulky and heavy for the power it
developed—about one ton per horsepower—and with its low efficiency its
fuel consumption was enormous. Engines powerful enough to give
appreciable speed and fuel sufficient for more than a few days’ use could
not be crowded into the same vessel. The steamship was therefore useful
mainly on inland waters where frequent refueling was possible.^®
Combine the low power to weight ratio with the vulnerability of engines to enemy fire and
the fact that they used up precious space, it is easy to appreciate why navies were reluctant
to adopt steam power.

" Brodie, Sea Power in the Machine Age, p. 18.
" Ibid., p. 22
"Ibid., p. 23.
’®Ibid.
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By the 1830's and 1840's, the perception o f steam power for warships began to
change. In order for steam warships to become practical and effective, a few technological
changes had to occur. First was the adoption o f the high-pressure steam engine. Earlier
low pressure engines were too inefficient to be viable powerplants for warships.
Improvements had to be made to the condenser, boiler, and the piston/cylinder. Fixing the
condenser problem was fmrly simple and so the condenser underwent the least amount of
change between the low and high pressure steam engines. The boiler went through many
changes and improvements. These included the return flue, water tubular, and fire tubular
boilers, which either ran tubes of water through the fire box or heat fi'om the fire box
through tubes in the boiler. All of these improved boilers increased the heating surface of
the boiler, which when combined with more robust boiler construction, resulted in more
efficient high pressure engines. Because of problems with incrustation resulting from the
use o f sea water in boilers, evaporators were developed to distill freshwater. This
eliminated the procedure o f blowing out the boiler to get rid of the fouling. Improvements
were also made in the piston/cylinder configurations. Configurations included vertical,
horizontal, and inclined cylinders.
The screw propeller combined with the high pressure steam e n ^ e made steam
warships truly practical. The screw propeller was developed independently by John
Ericsson and Francis P. Smith in England.^ Ericsson was unable to persuade the British

E.B Potter (ed.). The United States and World Sea Power (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice
Hall, Inc., 1955), pp. 260-61.
” E.B. Potter and Chester W. Nimitz (eds ). Sea Power: A Naval History (Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1960), p. 238.
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Admiralty o f the merits of his invention. He came to the United States at the request o f
Captain Robert F. Stockton, USN. Ericsson got authorization to build the first screw
propellor warship the Princeton in 1842.^ After this, the screw propeUor gained
acceptance. The screw propellor used to this day, was efQcient and eliminated the
vulnerability to shot and shell which plagued the paddle wheel, because it was under the
surface o f the water.
By the 1820's and 1830's the American and British navies began to develop small
numbers of steam warships for special uses. It took several technological innovations,
primarily in the size, weight and efficiency of the engines to make steam power a viable
propulsion system for warships. The steamer enjoyed greater maneuverability over a ship
o f sail and could use that maneuverability to its advantage.
By 1845 the potential of steam power for wide use in naval vessels was realized.
The French were the first to adopt a program to convert to steam power. Of course the
British sensed this as a threat to their national security and the first naval technological
arms race began. In Britain, the perceived possibilities o f steam power led to a panic over
the possibility o f invasion. Prevailing winds had long enabled the English Channel to serve
as a barrier to invasion. Steam power negated that protection. A warship could now go
wherever it desired, no matter what the weather.
Steam-propelled warships had their first great test during the Crimean War, and by
1857 the European naval community reached consensus that a ship vdthout steam
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equipment “was o f no tactical value.”’^ Steam power changed the tactical and strategic
nature o f naval warfare. Wind was no longer a factor. The three biggest changes wrought
by steam were 1) independence from wind and improved speed; 2) the introduction o f the
problem o f fuel; 3) “the modification of maritime geography, particularly in the relative
distances measured in days of sailing.”^^ Effectively, steam made ships more maneuverable,
more dependent on refueling bases (which would subsequently affect colonial aspirations
and make previous backwaters strategically important), and shrunk the size of the world
and response time to crises.

Iron Hulls and Armor
Iron ship construction was to follow closely on the heels o f steam propulsion. Until
the nineteenth century, timber had been the sole material used in ship construction. As a
construction material, timber presented several problems. Timber required seasoning,
constant maintenance, and repair. It was also vulnerable to fire and was not water tight.
The realization occurred early that iron would be a better material for construction. Iron
had greater strength than timber for a given weight, required less maintenance, and was
invulnerable to fire and could be used to create water tight compartments.
Iron construction of ships was first adopted by the British. They had historically
faced timber shortages, and their advantages in coal, iron ore, and industrial infrastructure
made iron an attractive choice. However, it required improvements in industrial processes
to make iron ship construction feasible. The first iron warships were steamers built in 1839

Brodie, Sea Power in the Machine Age, p. 76.
"Ib id ., p. 91.
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by the Royal Navy. They were the Phlegethon and the Nemesis. These two ships were the
first iron ships to see combat in the First Opium War o f 1840-1842 where they performed
outstandingly.’* Iron construction added strength and also increased the size of ships it
was possible to construct. It also meant the introduction o f the armor-clad and the
corresponding ordnance.
Iron ships not only had greater durability than wooden ships, but could also handle
great weights o f armor and much heavier and more powerfiil guns. The engagement of the

Merrimac and ihe Monitor at Hampton Roads, Virginia on March 9, 1862, was the first
time two ironclads fought one another. The engagement proved indecisive. According to
Brodie, this indecisiveness did not stem from the invulnerability o f armor, but rather fi*om
the failure to use the proper projectiles or propelling charges.” Because of considerable
improvements in gun and projectile technology, the two ships were relatively more
vulnerable to the ordnance o f their time than the U.S. S. Constitution was to the ordnance
of its time. However, armor dads continued to be improved, and with those improvements
in armor came improvements in the ordnance used to penetrate that armor. This resulted in
an arms race among the European Powers. Due to rapid improvements in technology, as
one ship was completed and left the ship yards, it had already been made obsolete by the
ship which was having its keel laid in the same yard. The biggest changes occurred in
ordnance. In fact, it was improved ordnance in the form o f the explosive shell and the gun
to fire them which was responsible for the adoption o f armor and ironclading. As historian

’* Potter (ed.). The United States and World Sea Power, p. 262.
” Brodie, Sea Power in the Machine Age, p. 172.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

51
James Baxter writes:
It was the introduction o f shell guns in naval warfare that upset the balance
between offence and defense. From the first introduction o f these
formidable weapons, some o f the leading advocates foresaw the necessity of
increased protection, and proposed the adoption o f armor.
Old wooden hulled ships could withstand solid shot well enough. It was the
explosive shell which doomed them by starting fiires, blasting great holes in the ship, and
igniting the powder magazine.’® After the Civil War, naval ordnance continued to improve.
The late nineteenth century saw tremendous improvements in the size, quality, and range
o f guns as well as the projectiles they threw. High quality steel permitted the construction
o f powerful guns and by the 1880's with the introduction o f slow burning (smokeless)
powders extremely high velocities and long ranges with heavy shot or shell was possible.
Eventually a point was reached where no matter how much armor a navy placed on a
vessel, someone would develop ordnance to penetrate it. So an equilibrium was reached.
Ships were heavily armored in the most vulnerable places and more lightly armored in
others, thereby introducing the development of the modem battleship.

New Missions and Priorities
The changes in naval technology brought by the Industrial Revolution not only
affected ship construction and performance, but the nature of naval strategy. The
importance o f overseas possessions for coaling stations and resupply helped to stimulate
international competition for control o f islands in areas such as the Pacific and the

’* James P. Baxter. The Introduction of the Ironclad Warship (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1933), p. 17.
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Caribbean. This combination o f technological improvement and increasing pressure to
expand influence abroad for both commercial purposes and security needs would affect
American naval policy over the course o f the nineteenth century. As we shall see, the
United States moved away from the token naval forces o f the Early Republic to a naval
power o f world rank after the Spanish-American War.
After the War of 1812, the US Navy went through a period of reorganization.
American naval policy began to be influenced strongly by needs beyond the coast of the
United States. Charles Paulin writes,
from 1815 to 1842 the principal duty o f the navy was the protection of
American citizens and commerce in foreign ports and seas. Next in
importance was its work in suppressing piracy. Indeed, its cruises against
the West India pirates from 1821 to 1826 constitute the chief “naval war” of
the period.*®
There was a need to have naval forces on station abroad, not just in home water. Thus, a
series o f squadrons were established over the course o f the next thirty years. The first of
these, the Mediterranean Squadron launched in 1815, focused upon the pirates o f the
Barbary States, which continued to prey upon American commerce.*' The West Indian
Squadron established in 1822, patrolled the Caribbean and the Gulf o f Mexico. In 1826 the
need to patrol the South Atlantic resulted in the establishment of the South American or
Braril Squadron. The growth in trade with the Orient required American naval presence in
the Pacific. Established in 1835, the East India Squadron fulfilled this role. A Home
Squadron to provide adequate patrolling of American waters was organized in 1841. The

*® Paulin, Ea]Lilm!jsJM Qiy..Qf N aval Administration 1775-1911, p 185
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need to interdict the slave trade resulted in the 1843 formation o f the African Squadron
The Anglo-American Crisis o f 1840-1841 precipitated the establishment o f the
Home Squadron to protect American shores. The crisis resulted from the arrest of
Alexander MacLeod, a British subject charged with the murder of an American citizen on
United States soil during the failed Canadian rebellion o f 1837. It was further complicated
by four other sources o f dispute with Britain. These were the boundary dispute between
Maine and New Brunswick, suppression of the slave trade, the efforts of the United States
to annex Texas, and the struggle over the Columbia River valley in the disputed Oregon
Territories." Webster-Ashburton Treaty o f 1842, peacefully defused the crisis, adjusting
the boundary between Maine and New Brunswick, and stretching through the Great Lakes
to the Lake of the Woods." However, the crisis and the threat posed by the improved
mobility o f steam power resulted in the push for a Home Squadron by the Whig
Administration. Previously the shallow coastline of the United States had protected it from
operations by deep draft sailing vessels. However, the newer shallow draft steam boats
could operate in this environment, rendering that defense moot."
By the 1840's, American maritime concerns had grown.

This is especially true in

the Pacific Ocean. Americans were settling in Mexican California. American whalers
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operated in the Pacific, and trade was increasing with the Far East. The Whigs proposed
an increase in the size of the Pacific Squadron and the establishment o f bases either on the
West Coast or Haw^i.**
With respect to naval policy, domestic sectional realignment began to occur. The
Southern States which had previously been anti-navy were now shifting to a decidedly pronavy stance. This was a result of the presence o f British naval installations in the West
Indies (Bermuda) and the threat they presented to Southern ports in the event o f war. The
newer states emerging in the central portion o f the continent, and those away fi-om the
ocean still tended to vote against naval increases which had no particular interest to them
According to the Sprouts, Inland Democrats voted solidly against the navy, as did Whigs
firom Kentucky and Tennessee. “Representatives fi-om the fi-ontier States of Michigan,
Illinois, and Missouri, all voted anti-navy regardless of party affiliation.’**^
Troubles between the United States and Great Britdn were not over. The Oregon
Crisis o f 1845-1846 resulted from a boundary dispute involving the region west o f the
continental divide. Both countries had agreed to joint occupation of the resource rich
Oregon Country in 1818. By the mid-1840's relations became tense as settlers fi"om both
countries moved into the territory. A war scare erupted as western expansionist “War
Hawks” in Congress demanded that the United States accept no less than the northern
boundary o f the Oregon Country, coining the phrase, “54" 40* or Fight.” The British
wanted to set the boundary line at the mouth o f the Columbia River, along the line of 42

“ Ibid., p. 119.
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degrees north latitude.** TTms situation was exacerbated by the election o f the expansionist
minded Democrat, James K. Polk to the Presidency in 1844. According to the Sprouts,
with respect to naval policy,
throughout the crisis, the Administration pursued a decidedly anomalous
course. While publicly defying the British Empire, the President took no
positive steps in preparation for war. And although war was widely
regarded as imminent throughout the autumn o f 1845, the naval estimates
for 1846-1847, sent to congress in December 1845, were only two-thirds as
large as those submitted the preceding year by the Tyler Administration.*®
Polk refused to mend the deficiencies in naval preparedness. In comparison, as of
March 1846, the US Navy had seven steamers mounting a total of 39 guns, while the
British had 141 war steamers mounting 698 guns and the French had 68 steamships
mounting 430 guns.®® A compromise was reached establishing the boundary at 49 degrees
north latitude, leaving Vancouver Island in British hands. This agreement added 285,000
square miles to the United States.®' The United States was never presented with the
daunting task of facing the British Royal Navy with such a pitiful token force.
The Democrats decided to take an alternative route to acquiring steamships as
opposed to strengthening the regular navy. Instead, they began a program o f subsidizing
the construction o f merchant steamers which could theoretically be converted into warships
if necessary. This idea appealed to those who backed a small navy. What resulted was a
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compromise measure. The navy obtained four steam ships and the shipping companies
were awarded subsidies for the construction o f merchant steamers to be converted into
warships if the need arose. This idea slowed the development o f the US Navy. Even
though it did have some practical merits such as providing additional hulls for fleet
logistical support, converted merchant ships were no match for real men-of-war. The
concept eventually died out with improvements and changes in naval technology.”
The crises of the mid-1840's coincided with one of the most important
developments for the navy as an institution and for the future o f naval policy making.
During his tenure as Secretary of the Navy 1845-1846, George Bancroft established the
Naval School at Annapolis which would become the United States Naval Academy. A
naval college had been debated in the past, but attempts to establish one had been difficult.
Bancroft skillfully avoided red tape and other interference by establishing the school when
Congress was out o f session. First he acquired Fort Severn in Annapolis from the War
Department (Bancroft also happened to be acting Secretary of War) and moved the
Academy’s predecessor, the small and under-equipped Philadelphia Naval School to the
site. A board under the chairmanship of Commander Franklin Buchanan subsequently drew
up the curriculum and created the rank of naval cadet. The course of study would consist
o f two years study at the Academy, three years at sea, and one more year on a training
vessel. Classes began on October 10, 1845.” Bancroft saved money by firing the majority
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o f the instructors who had been teaching at the Philadelphia Naval School. This amounted
to a savings of $30,000. When Congress came back into session and saw what Bancroft
had done, “Congress blinked a little at the changes, saw that they were good, and voted
that the thirty thousand dollars saved should be used to improve the new school.”®* Five
years later in 1850, the school was officially titled the United States Naval Academy.®*

The Mexican War and the 1850's
The Mexican War did not involve a great deal of naval actions like the Revolution
or the War o f 1812. The role o f the navy was primarily logistical with a few exceptions
such as Commodore Perry’s expedition up the Tabasco River and the capture of Tampico.
Its most important combat operation was the Siege o f Veracruz which was the largest
American amphibious landing prior to the landings in North Africa in 1942.®® The navy
basically served as a ferry service for the army. It was not a war which the navy was best
prepared for either. Historian Samuel Morison states.
Although war between the United States and Mexico did not formally begin
until May 1846, it had long been anticipated. Unpaid claims, the annexation
o f Texas, President Polk’s ambition to acquire California, and the
disinclination of the Mexican government to negotiate —all contributed to
the outbreak of a war that could easily have been avoided by less
aggressiveness on one side and more realism on the other. Yet neither
country had prepared for was. The United States Navy, with several fine
new frigates, sloops, and brigs built to fight a blue-water war with a
European power, lacked both light-draft steamers and sailing vessels which
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could operate profitably along the Gulf Coast and up the rivers o f Mexico.
Even so, it was overwhelmingly superior to the Mexican Navy. A small
squadron o f enemy warships could have steamed right up to New York and
shelled it, so feeble were the city’s defenses. But Mexico had no ships
capable of steaming that far.’^
The Mexican War was the first real operation o f the new steam technology in a
combat environment in the hands of the US Navy. According to the Sprouts,
The Mexican War (1846-1848), fought mostly on land, afforded little
opportunity for testing the strategic principles and naval technology still in
vogue within the United States. But that conflict nevertheless had some
naval implications. In particular, it demonstrated the importance of superior
naval power as an adjunct to oversea military operations.^
Besides providing logistical support, the navy protected American ships from
depredation by Mexican commerce raiders and privateers. This last threat ended up being
no threat at all. The Mexican War was not a very good testing ground for naval combat
operations. That would not occur until the US Civil War fifteen years later. The Mexican
War did have one major effect on naval policy. The territorial acquisitions fi'om Mexico by
the United States meant that the United States would be forced to defend two coasts. This
fact would influence naval policy over the course of the rest o f the nineteenth century and
into the twentieth. It would lead to greater American interest in the Pacific, a two ocean
navy, and a trans-isthmian canal in Panama.
The navy did play an important role in the 1850's in the opening o f Japan to US
trade. According to historian Edgar S. Maclay, “The increasing commerce with China, the
growth of whale fishing, and the rapid development of California made it necessary to open

^Ibid., p.179.
Sprout and Sprout, The Rise o f American Naval Power, p. 135.
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Japan, and in 1851 Congress decided to send an expedition to that country.”’® The
expedition o f 1853-1854 by Commodore Matthew C Perry was successful. With an
impressive show of force and skilled diplomacy. Commodore Perry managed to negotiate a
treaty opening the ports of Simoda and Hakodate for coaling and supply, and also for the
repatriation of shipwreck victims . According to Morison, “It [the treaty] fulfilled the two
main objects of his Expedition —castaways and ports o f refuge —and he rightly regarded
the permission to establish an American consulate as an opening for future trade.”^®®
The whole expedition was conducted peacefully without shedding a drop of blood, and
upheld national honor.

Although conduced peacefully, the show o f force in the form of

Perry’s warships used for purposes of diplomacy is an example o f the use of a navy as an
instrument of coercive diplomacy, appropriately called “gunboat diplomacy.”

The CivU War
The Civil War became the school for new naval tactics versus the old. In addition,
there was the widespread introduction o f armor-clad vessels and other new weapons which
the industrial revolution enabled. These included the first successful attack by a
submersible against a surface ship, and the first duel between armor-clad ships whose sole
motive power was steam.
With respect to naval policy, the Federal side found itself with a decided advantage
over the Confederacy. The Union had a fairly large fleet. The Confederacy on the other
” Edgar S. Maclay, Historv of the Navy. 2 Vols. (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1895),
n: 192-93.
Morison, “Old Bruin”, p. 380.
Ibid.
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hand found itself in much the same position as the United States found itself during the
Revolution. The CSA managed to build some ships, and bought cruisers firom Europe,
notably Britain. Unlike the USA, the CSA was unable to cobble together a fleet of
substantial size to put it on an equal footing with the Union Navy and was forced to engage
in guerre de course. The USA on the other hand used its navy to advantage. The Lincoln
Administration ordered a blockade of Confederate ports in order to slowly strangle the
Confederacy into submission. The blockade worked fairiy well. However, it was not
perfect. Blockade runners were able to get in and out in many places. Also, Confederate
cruisers, particularly the CSS Alabama exacted a tremendous toll on Union shipping,
e n g a ^ g in commerce raiding. The Alabama alone was responsible for the decline of New
England whaling, which never recovered. The depredations wrought by the Alabama
would result as a source o f animosity between the United States and Great Britain for
nearly twenty years after the war. The Alabama was built in Britain and the US demanded
reparations for the damage she had caused.
With the close of the Civil War, the era o f the sailing ship as the main ship of the
line had come to a close. The Industrial Revolution and advances in metallurgy insured
that the wooden sailing vessel armed with muzzle-loading smoothbore guns firing solid
shot would be replaced by steam propelled, steel hulled, armored vessels armed with
breech-loading rifles firing high explosive armor piercing shells. The period stretching
roughly fi’om the close o f the Civil War to August of 1914 would include a series of arms
races. The leading maritime nations o f the world would compete viciously with one
another on the drawing board. Ships would become bigger and faster. Armor would
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become stronger and heavier. Guns would increase in weight and caliber, shooting farther
and more accurately. In many cases, as each new ship came out of the dock yards it was
already obsolete compared to the ship whose keel was being Wd in the next dry dock.
H.M.S. Dreadnought^ for example, which had its keel laid in October o f 1905, was much
faster and more hea\ily armed than its sister ships LordN el^n and Agamemnon^ laid just
one year before.

Stagnation and the New Navy
The twenty five years between the close of the Civil War and 1890 was a period of
profound change in American naval policy. The US Navy moved fi’om a navy dominated
by wooden vessels and muzzle-loading guns to a navy o f steel vessels armed with breech
loading rifies. There was also a profound change in the direction of naval policy and naval
thinking. Stephen Howarth succinctly describes the whole of American naval history in one
statement. Mr. Howarth states.
For the nation, the last twenty years of the nineteenth century were a time of
transition; for the navy, they were more than a time of reconstruction—they
were years o f renaissance. Looking back today over two centuries of
American naval history, those twenty years separate the first and second
centuries with astonishing sharpness. In its first hundred years, the U.S.
Navy was built of wood, powered by the wind, and governed essentially by
a coastal defense, commerce-raiding, single ship strategy. Then came the
dividing years, the birth of the New Navy; and in their second hundred years
America's warships have been built o f steel, powered by steam, and
governed by a strategy o f oceanic fleets.*®’
The first problem during this period was the transition fi’om the old navy to the new

*®^Robert K. Massie, Dreadnough t , pp. 477-78.
*“ Stephen Howarth, To Shining Sea, p. 232.
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navy. In the years following the Civil War, the navy had effectively been allowed to
languish and pass on into technological obsolescence. There were a couple of reasons for
this. Hstorian Walter Herrick points out that,
Inevitably, the myth o f monitor invincibility and the inflated reputation of
Southern ndders substantiated the traditional interpretation of the naval
mission. With the return of peace, therefore, the monitors assumed the task
o f patrolling the shoreline, while wooden cruisers resumed their flag
showing function overseas. Although the war had revealed the
ineffectiveness of these types when unsupported by a strategic force, they
continued to symbolize American naval doctrine until Congress authorized
construction of the country’s first steel warships in 1883.*"
Supporters o f the old navy believed that the system o f commerce raiding which had
been the staple o f American naval strategy during the past would continue to be an
effective strategy for the future. At the same time they supported armored gunboats for
coastal defense to supplement coastal fortifications. This philosophy was very nearly a
throwback to the policies of the Jefferson administration nearly seventy years before.
These conservative elements also influenced ship design by proposing that steamers retain
masts for auxiliary propulsion and wooden hulls. The situation was so bad in the mid1870's that Stephen Howarth observed.
And yet in 1876, the centenary o f the Declaration o f Independence, a world
survey o f ‘Naval Powers and their Policy,’ published in Œ eat Britain, did
not include the United States. Fifteen nations were described, including
some which one might not think o f as obvious today—Brazil, Turkey, Peru,
Austria. But o f the American fleet, all that was said was that its guns were
‘condemned all over the world and superseded,’ and that its ‘system of
armor plating is unsound.’ The survey concluded: it is surprising that the

*" Walter R. Herrick, Jr., The American Naval Revolution (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1966), p. 9.
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Navy o f the United States has been so neglected o f late years’*®®
Things began to turn around in the ISSO's. Amidst the general deterioration and
malaise which gripped the navy, progressive thinking ofiQcers began to make their mark.
Herrick points out that.
Paradoxically, the postwar period o f regression marked the birth of
professionalism in the service. It produced a new breed o f officers inspired
by the progressive ideas o f Commodore Stephen B. Luce and Captain
Alfred T. Mahan, whose promotion of the naval War College fostered the
study of naval warfare as a science. Founded by Luce in 1884 at Newport,
Rhode Island, this institution - the first of its kind anywhere - barely
survived the attacks aimed at it in infancy by anti-intellectual senior officers
but ultimately won recognition as an essential naval facility.*®®
The Naval War College was a revolutionary educational institution. It provided an
environment for post-graduate study of naval warfare. The establishment of this school led
to a greater level o f professionalism in the naval officer corps. One other institution which
raised the level of professionalism and the progression of naval thinking was the United
States Naval Institute, founded in 1873. Its journal Proceedings provided a medium for
the exchange of ideas by naval officers and others interested in naval affairs.*®^

Proceedings was an important publication because it permitted debate over naval policy,
tactics, and strategy fi-ee fi'om the control o f the Navy Department.*®* The Naval Institute
encouraged fi-ee debate and expertise in the naval community and has remained important
to this day.

*®® Howarth, To Shining Sea, p. 216.
*®®Herrick, The American Naval Revolution, p. 10.
*®^ Ibid., p. 21.
*®*Love, History o f the U .S. Navy, p 330.
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Mahan
During this period o f naval transition, Cq>tain Alfred Thayer Mahan o f the US
Navy would revolutionize naval thinking throughout the world. Mahan arguably had the
greatest impact on naval strategy in modem times. He had a rather uneventful early career
in the navy. It was not until the middle o f his career that he made a name for himself. A
very religious man, Mahan o ri^ a lly disapproved o f the notion o f empire and imperialism.
However, as his career advanced, he discovered some important historical relationships
between sea power and national greatness. This led him away from an isolationist view o f
the place o f America in world affairs. He began to proselytize in order to convert his own
countrymen to the view that the path to national greatness lay in sea power.**’’ He was a
fairly prolific writer and wrote a number of essays which received the attention o f his
superiors. This led to an appointment to a lectureship at the Naval War College.**® From
his lectures, Mahan prepared three notable works. These were The Influence o f Sea Power
Upon History 1660-1783. The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and

Empks.l.7SlzI.8.12. and S.ea£.Q\y.fir.iajls.Mation to thg War of.l812. In these works,
Mahan used historical example to demonstrate the importance o f sea power in histoiy,
interweaving policy, tactics, and strategy.*** Mahan’s conclusions stunned the naval
community world wide. He quickly became the prophet and champion o f sea power as a
major arm o f foreign policy, especially in the United States. Paul Kennedy states.

*“*Livezey, Mahan on Sea Power, pp. 83-84.
**®M. Sprout, “Mahan,” p. 417.
Ill

Ibid.
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Whatever reservations one might have upon Mahan’s analysis o f the past, it
is clear that his interpretations and ideas were most significant, throwing a
new light upon the course o f European history; no scholar since his day
could write about the rise o f the British Empire without acknowledgment to
the role of sea power. What was true o f the past was not necessarily so of
the future, however, yet at the same time it was an ‘evangelist of sea power’
rather than as a naval historian pure and simple that he was regarded;
journalists, admirals, and statesmen hung upon his predictions and accepted
his teachings as a virtually complete doctrine of power-politics. In point of
fact, Mahan’s mind was too rooted in the past to be much o f a success in
this field of prophecy."^
During this period, the United States was going through an expansionist phase,
desiring to g^n territory and influence outside the boundaries o f the continent. Chief on
the minds o f presidents such as Grant were naval bases in the Caribbean and a potential
canal across the Isthmus o f Panama. This drive was largely unsuccessful through the
1870's and I880's, because, according to historian George T. Davis, “a war-weary public
refused to entertain expansionist plans or to see that the defensive requirements of
American policy made a Caribbean base necessaiy.”“ ^ It would not be until the SpanishAmerican War that the United States would gain territory and the bases it desired in the
Caribbean. The United States did try to negotiate annexation with Santo Domingo, and
many Americans favored intervention in the Cuban uprisings of the period. There was also
a tremendous push to get a canal through Nicaragua."^
The Caribbean and Central America were not the only places where the United
States had a growing interest. Hawaii and Samoa were inviting as well. Hawaii would be
"^Kennedy, The Rise and Fall o f British Naval Mastery, p. 183.
George T. Davis, A N aw Second to None, p.28.
Charles S. Campbell, The Transformation of American F o rei^ Relations: 1865-1900,
(New York: Harper & Row, 1976), pp. 220-38.
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an important acquisition for access to China. American interests were pushing for
commercial expansion because o f the tremendous increases in production on the part o f
American industry. Asia, Africa, and Latin America all had vast potential as markets. The
United States became more involved during this period from the mid-1870's through the
1890's in the Pacific Ocean and in China as a result of this push for commercial
expansionism.

American Overseas Expansion
The 189G's would prove to be the turning point in American foreign relations as the
United States grew into a world power. There was the Hawaiian Revolution o f 1893
which was led by Americans, but the government in Washington restored the Hawaiian
Monarchy. America intervened in the boundary dispute between Britain and Venezuela
which resulted in an Anglo-American agreement in 1896 to put the matter to arbitration.
Finally there was the war with Spain in 1898. This war and its aftermath brought the
United States colonial possessions. The US gained the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and
administration over Cuba. The United States by 1900 had become a colonial power.
The United States got its first chance to expand beyond the confines of the North
American continent in the Spanish-American War o f 1898. President McKinley reluctantly
decided to intervene in Cuba. Reported cruelties by the Spanish in Cuba raised American
public opinion to a fever pitch. The explosion o f

Maine provided the necessary excuse

to go to war. The war that ensued could hardly be called a war, but resulted in American
overseas possessions. Although Cuba was supposed to become independent, the Platt
Amendment, stating that the United States had the right to intervene in Cuban afimrs.
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sharply curtailed that independence. This was especially true with regard to Cuban foreign
policy. The United States was also left with the task of pacifying the Philippines which
many Americans believed was a necessary possession to have in order to have influence in
China. With reference to China, in 1899 John Hay published the Open Door Notes which
said in effect that the United States desired equal trading rights for everyone in China.
Success in the Spanish-American War made the United States a global power. The
ability to prosecute the war depended upon the naval superiority o f the United States over
Spain. Importantly, it was this war which validated Mahan’s theory of sea power. The US
Navy bottled up the Spanish fleet in Cuba, and destroyed the Spanish fleet in the
Philippines. As a result, the United States was able to win a stunning victory even though
land operations, particulariy in Cuba, were plagued by logistical problems and in some
cases incompetent leadership.
The territorial gains at the conclusion of the Spanish-American War were important
to the United States both commercially and in terms o f national security needs. For
decades, America had been looking to expand into the Caribbean. Prior to the Civil War
this had been retarded by the reluctance o f Northerners to accept new slave territory, which
Southerners desired. After the war, with the issue o f slavery resolved, national policy
turned to the Caribbean, primarily due to concerns over national security and commerce. If
a proposed canal were built across the Isthmus of Panama, the United States would need
bases in the Caribbean to secure it. Because o f the importance of the canal question.

Lloyd C. Gardner, Imperial America: American Foreign Policy Since. 189g. (New
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Inc., 1976), pp. 37-40.
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Secretary o f State John Hay signed the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty with Great Britain in 1901
for mutual benefit. The preamble to the treaty states*
The United States of America and M s Majesty Edward the Seventh . . .
being desirous to facilitate the construction of a ship canal to connect the
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, by whatever route may be considered
expedient, and to that end to remove any objection which may arise out of
the Convention o f the 19th April, 1850, commonly called the ClaytonBulwer Treaty, to the construction o f such canal under the auspices of the
Government of the United States, without impairing the ‘general principle’
o f neutralization established in Article VM o f that convention.. .***
The treaty eliminated any British objection to the construction of the canal by the
United States. When built, the canal was to remain open to shipping of all nations
observing the rules of the treaty. The importance of the canal to the United States would
be monumental for it eventually would permit the rapid movement o f US naval force fi’om
one ocean to the other.
In order to secure the canal and provide necessary coaling and naval bases for US
ships in the Caribbean, the United States leased Guantanamo Bay from the Republic of
Cuba beginning in 1903. The United States still holds this lease today.
In the Pacific, the Philippines and the acquisition of other islands during this period,
including Hawaii, were important to the protection and promotion o f commerce in the Far
East. Particularly, the United States needed coaling stations for the Pacific Squadron and
bases o f operation to help enforce the Open Door Notes in order to maintain open trade

Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 17761949. Volume 12 United Kingdom-Zanzibar. Charles I. Bevans,Compiler., (Washington:
Department o f State Publication 8761, 1974), XEt: 258.
Ibid., Volume 6 Canada-Czechoslovakia. VI: 1113-15
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with China.

Summary
The Industrial Revolution occurring in the nineteenth century profoundly affected
American naval policy. The most profound effects of industrialization involved
technological and economic change. Changes in technology included steam propulsion, a
shift from wooden to metal ship construction, armor plating, and improved ordnance. New
naval strategy and tactics had to be de\dsed. New lo^stical problems caused by the need to
refuel the ships resulted the need for overseas coaling stations The new industrial economy
produced surpluses which required overseas markets. A strong navy became necessary to
protect expanding commerce.
By the end of the war with Spain, the United States met all six elements o f sea
power from the Mahanian thesis. In relation to its geographical position, it was bi-coastal,
and because of weak neighbors, its military frontiers were on the sea. It also had acquired
overseas possessions which required the protection of a strong navy. The physical
conformation of the United States was such that it had excellent harbors on both coasts,
and major waterways into the interior (like the Mississippi River) which offered easier
access to the sea for the people of the country. The extent o f coastline relative to the size
o f the country had increased dramatically as the United States acquired territory and
consolidated it over the course of the nineteenth century. The number o f people dependent
upon the sea had also increased dramatically. Trade from abroad came by sea, and in
return, the newly industrialized United States needed to export manufactured and
agricultural surpluses in order to maintain a healthy economy. Thus the character o f the
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people reflected a new appreciation for the sea and the prosperity that it could bring.
Finally, the character of the government had become such that the navy and maritime
interests received a greater degree o f importance, especially in light o f the acquisition of
new colonies and the need to defend them.
The nineteenth century proved to be the crucible in which the United States was
tested, melted, and reforged stronger than before. America began the century as a weak
political experiment and ended the centuiy as a strong emerging world power. The events
o f that one hundred years placed the nation and its navy in a position to become a leader in
world affairs in the twentieth century.
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Chapter IV: The Twentieth Century
American naval policy during the twentieth century can best be understood in
relation to the themes o f international relations and technological change. The theme of
international relations is evident as the twentieth centuiy has become the American century
in world affairs. The United States historically experienced political and geographic
isolation. But, because the United States found itself drawn into Europe’s wars twice in
this century, it could no longer afford to remain isolationist and retreat behind the security
of its oceans as in the past. The postwar political climate and technology made this
impossible. With the threat of Soviet expansion into Western Europe after the war, and the
fact that technology rendered the oceans meaningless as a source o f protection and
isolation, the United States was forced to become a world player.
The twentieth century has been the most destructive century in the history of
mankind. The revolutionary technological progress o f the nineteenth century exploded in
the twentieth. Advances in industrialism provided the infi’astructure necessary to make
warfare efficiently destructive. With respect to navies, the twentieth centuiy has spawned
the most revolutionary technological changes in maritime history. Navies and naval policy
have been impacted by naval aviation, submarine warfare, sonar, nuclear propulsion,
submarine launched ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles. Navies are no longer just
concerned with protecting lines o f communication and blockading the enemy coast. Navies
have always been instruments o f power projection. Now navies are no longer limited by
the range o f their guns. Power can be projected far inland by means of naval aircraft and
cruise missiles like the Tomahawk. Sea lift capabilities have been greatly improved. There
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are few places left on Earth that cannot be touched by the power o f a technologically upto-date navy at the close o f this century, particularly by the US Navy.
O f all technological changes that occurred in the twentieth century though, the most
important was in communication. In the previous centuries, communication was slow. By
the twentieth century, the speed of communication became almost instantaneous. This
revolutionized not only naval operations and strategy but also merchant activity. With
respect to this change Albion and Pope point out.
Many a Yankee captain, for instance, first heard of the War o f 1812 when
he was overhauled by a British cruiser or privateer. New Orleans was not
the only battle fought after peace had come in 1815; the Constitution fought
the Cyane and the Levant off BrariUI several months after that. Even in
1865, the Shenandoah destroyed the Yankee whaling fleet in Bering Strût
four months after Lee surrendered at Appomattox. Wireless has made all
this a very different story in 1939 and 1941. On the whole, however, the
development o f rapid communication was to help the hunted merchantmen
far more than the raiders who pursued them."'
The rapid changes in technology and political climate over the course of the twentieth
century have resulted in rapid changes in American naval policy, and therefore the eventual
ascendency of American sea power.
The G reat W hite Fleet
The Great White Fleet symbolized a change in America’s international relations.
The ambitious voyage of the Great White Fleet around the world —October 16, 1907 February 22, 1909 - signaled that America took its new position in the world seriously.
Historian Samuel Carter describes the beginning o f the voyage by stating.
Sixteen snow-white battleships, guns and brass gleaming, signal flags

"* Albion and Pope, Sea Lanes in Wartime, p. 32.
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whipping in the breeze, stretched in a double line from Fort Munroe to the
open sea a mile away —straining like bulldogs at their leashes to set forth on
an epoch-making journey. Their declared destination: fourteen thousand
miles to San Francisco, though rumor had it they would press on clear
around the world. Their ostensible purpose: to allay the fear of Californians
that their coast was threatened by Japanese invasion and to convince Japan
that she no longer dominated the Pacific. Their were other goals, however.
Among them, to impress the world with America’s newfound naval might
and secure for the country its just role as a power among nations; and too,
to stimulate public interest in the navy, and to win support for the still
unfinished Panama Canal."^
The Great White Fleet was not just an exercise in public relations. Its purpose as a
demonstration o f American naval power was real. At the beginning of the twentieth
century, a definite rivalry began between the United States and Japan for future mastery of
the Pacific Ocean. Only two years earlier in February o f 1904, the Japanese Navy had
destroyed the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet at the Battle o f Tsushima Strait. Suddenly Japan
was thrust upon the world stage as a serious naval power. It was likely that American and
Jrpanese interests would collide. The United States had gained colonial possessions in the
Pacific including the Philippines after 1898. The close proximity between American
possessions and Japan was certain to create tensions between the two emerging powers.
Regarding this tension historian Samuel Carter states.
In world opiiuon, war between Japan and the United States was a foregone
conclusion. The British Admiralty was betting five to four that the Japanese
would be wctorious. A widely circulated German novel. Banzai^ related
how the Japanese navy wiped out the American navy and invaded
California. President Roosevelt distrusted jingoism, but he was aware of
this existing threat. ‘My own judgement is,’ he said, ‘that the only thing
which will prevent war is the Japanese feeling that we shall not be beaten.’

" ’^Samuel Carter IH The Incredible Great White Fleet: America Comes of Aee as a World
Power fNew York: Crowell-Collier Press, 1971), pp. 1-2.
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Sending a strong fleet to the Pacific was one way to promote that feeling.
This tension between the United States and Japan led President Roosevelt in 1907
to ask Admiral D e w ^ to draw up a war plan in the event that a war with Japan should
break out. The War Plan Orange strategy provided that should the Philippines be attacked
by the Japanese, the army would retire to Corre^dor while the cruisers o f the Asiatic Fleet
would retire to Hawaii. They would then rendezvous with the battleships of the Atlantic
Fleet. The fleet would then assault the Philippines, rescue the troops at Corregidor, and
establish forward bases fi*om which to attack Japanese shipping The navy would then
attempt to force a decisive naval engagement with the Japanese Fleet and defeat it. War
Plan Orange as originally drafted had one problem. It required a forward staging area
somewhere in the Pacific other than the Philippines. Memories o f Tsushima Strait were too
fi'esh in the minds of US Navy men, and without a forward base they did not believe that
the plan would be successful.*^’
The cruise o f the Great White Fleet did not cause an outbreak in hostilities between
Japan and the United States. It was in fact, a public relations success, particularly in South
America. The cruise o f the fleet around the world signaled American naval power ranked
with the Great Powers o f Europe. It also had the effect domestically o f stimulating interest
in the navy and world affairs. According to historian Samuel Carter,
But when all is said and done, the cruise accomplished something that
Americans could by and large be grateful for. It had roused the navy fi’om
its post-Civil War torpor to a position second only to that o f Great Britain.

* ^ id ., p. 6.
*^* Love, History o f the U.S. N aw . pp. 437-38.
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It had roused the Country from a narrow interest in its own concerns to a
broader interest in world affairs. Almost overnight, we had become a
major, influential power. It was not a height from which we could look
complacently upon the world, but one which challenged our handling o f the
future.
The voyage o f the Great White Fleet around the world signified the e m e r^ g
position o f the United States as a world power. The United States Navy had become a
respectable force, a dramatic change from a quarter century before when it was effectively
a historical relic.
As the world crept toward war in the years between 1905 and 1914, the United
States Navy prepared itself for possible conflict. War Plan Orange was modified, and in
1911 the first fully developed version o f the plan “was predicated on a war between Japan
and the United States erupting over a Japanese violation o f the Open Door Policy or
aggression against the Philippines.”^^ Admiral George Dewey’s greater concern over a
possible conflict with Germany, led to the creation o f War Plan Black. Germany (with
support from Britain and Italy) tried to intervene in Venezuela in 1901-1902 after
Venezuela’s dictator, Cipriano Castro, declined to repay $12 million lent by the three
European nations. This led to President Roosevelt taking a hard line stance against Berlin,
invoking the Monroe Doctrine. The Black Plan was based on the possibility that if
Germany tried to gæn a foothold on South America, the Atlantic Fleet would deploy to the
Caribbean and take whatever action was necessary to reverse German actions.

Carter, The Incredible Great White Fleet, pp. 177-78.
Love, Historv o f the U.S. Nayy. pp. 447-48.
Ibid., pp. 425-428.
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Fortunately, War Plan Black never went into efiect. War Plan Orange on the other hand,
effectively became the strategy for the United States during World War II in the Pacific
Theater.

World War I
The United States was driven into the First World War for much the same reason it
was driven into the War o f 1812: trouble on the high seas. Although the United States
government tried to keep out of the destructive war in Europe and remain neutral, it
proved to be a difficult task. The German Navy attacked American ships and shipping on
several different occasions using submarines. The sinking o f the Lusitania on the 7th of
May, 1915 off of Ireland resulted in 1,198 dead, 128 o f whom were Americans. The
Germans were attempting to interdict trade with Great Britain. This guerre de course by
German U-Boats severely strained relations between America and Germany and eventually
resulted in American entry into the war in 1917.
The problems German actions in the Atlantic posed for the United States were
directly related to problems o f sea power. The United States was a neutral nation.
German unrestricted submarine warfare violated the protections normally afforded a neutral
on the oceans o f the world.
In order to win the war, the Germans had to gmn command of the sea and cut off
the enemy’s communications. Allan Westcott and his collaborators state,
Germany, meanwhile, was complaining that the vastness o f our trade with
the Allied powers amounted to favoritism and therefore unneutrality. It is
true that the war material we sold to the Allies was used to kill Germans,
but we had the undeniable right to sell munitions to the belligerents, so long
as it was on an impartial basis. It was no fault o f ours that Germany was
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too tightly blockaded by English sea power to o b t ^ them, other than by
submarines, or that England’s control o f the sea enabled her to trade freely
with us. Yet this one-sided traffic soon brought us to diplomatic grips with
Germany.
Germany declared a war zone around the British Isles on the 4th of February, 1915
which naturally led to problems with the United States. The only effective tool that the
Germans had for the job was the submarine. Military necesaty drove them to the use of
unrestricted submarine warfare in order to enforce their blockade o f Britain. The United
States had difficulties with both sides’ violation of neutral rights. The British engaged in
many annoying practices including requiring our ships to put in at British ports to be
inspected for contraband. However, as Westcott points out,
our protests to Germany were particularly sharp and uncompromising
primarily because her infractions of the recognized law of the sea entailed
loss, not merely o f property but of lives. Furthermore they involved not
extension, as by England, but a growing disregard o f the rules controlling
sea warfare. There is a certæn fundamental justice in the age-old principles
governing the relations o f neutrals and belligerents at sea. The high seas are
a great common highway open to all, and at the same time an inevitable
fighting arena o f nations at war.*“
It was this clash between free highway and battleground which eventually brought
America into the war. Of all the belligerents, Germany made the most egregious violations
o f international law vnth respect to the rights of neutrals on the high seas. When the
Germans instituted unrestricted submarine warfare on February 1, 1917, and declared that
all ships within a specific barred zone would be sunk, the Urated States was driven to
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declare war on April 6, 1917.*^^ Prior to declaring war. President Wilson ordered the
arming o f merchantmen which would be heading to the war zone which surrounded Britain.
When the United States entered the war, the navy was tasked primarily to convoy
duty, protecting the lines o f communication from German submarines. This important
function enabled American troops and supplies to be ferried to Europe. With respect to the
navy’s role in World War I, Stephen Howarth states.
As far as World War I is concerned, there was for the U.S. Navy, a certain
similarity with the Mexican War of sixty years earlier. In both, the Army
fought all the headline actions, while the Navy performed essential
functions, dangerous but unglamourous. In both wars, those functions
included superlatives - during the Mexican War, the biggest landing of
troops ever undertaken; during World War I, the biggest convoy of troops.
That was the U.S. Navy’s primaiy contribution, and the vital one; but there
was more, for in mine laying, antisubmarine warfare, and naval aviation, the
fleet took contemporary technology to the limit, pointing the way to the
future. No one would deny that infighting, the doughboys were preeminent;
but it is worthwhile remembering who enabled them to fight, and how ."'
The United States Navy spent the war convoying troops and supplies to Europe.
Within six months from April 1917 to November 1917, monthly shipping losses dropped
from 835,000 tons to slightly over 250,000 tons.*” The convoy system instituted nightly
blackouts and zigzagging independent of weather conditions. Ships were camouflaged
using a pattern of lines and squares in different colors called “dazzle pdnting.” This
technique made it difficult to determine a ship’s distance or course. Hydrophones, listening
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underwater for sounds from ships, were also used.*" These techniques tested during the
First World War, would be repeated when the world once again collapsed into war a
generation later. Although not playing as glamorous a role as the army during the war, the
navy was integral to Allied victory.

The Inter-War Years and Arms Limitation
After the calamity o f the Great War, and the recognition that competition between
the Great Powers contributed to the conditions necessary for war, governments began to
see a need for some sort o f arms control. They applied the tools of international relations
to the problems posed by technology. Navies were included, because of the battleship arms
race which preceded World War I. The Washington Treaties of 1922-1923 attempted to
limit the size of the navies o f the Great Powers of the world in order to prevent escalation
into war. The treaties proclaimed.
The United States of America, The British Empire, France, Italy and Japan;
Desiring to contribute to the general peace, and to reduce the burdens of
competition in armament; Have resolved, with a view to accomplishing
these purposes, to conclude a treaty to limit their respective naval
armament, and to that end have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries: [etc.,
etc.,] Who, having communicated to each other their respective full
powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:. .
The Washington Treaties were a series of treaties. The first dealt with naval
armament. Others dealt with issues such as insular possessions in the Pacific (the Four
Power Pact), submarines and gas warfare, and the Nine Power Treaty relating to China.

*"Ibid., pp. 310-11.
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All of these issues would be pertinent to World War II within just a few years.
The Five Power Treaty signed February 6, 1922 by the United States, Britain,
Japan, France, and Italy established a capital ship ratio o f 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 in the same order
as the nations listed. In order to get Japan to agree to an inferior position in the ratio,
Britain and the United States agreed not to continue fortifying naval and military
installation within striking distance o f the Japanese Home Islands. The Japanese also
agreed not to fortify islands and archipelagoes such as Formosa, the Bonins, the
Pescadores, or the Ryukus.^^^ The London Conference which followed in 1930 maintained
the capital ship ratio between the United States, Britain and Japan from 5:5:3 and increased
the ratio for lighter ships such as cruisers and destroyers to 10:10:7.*^^ However, by 1934,
naval arms limitation would reach an impasse. Japan had demanded naval parity with the
United States and Great Britain but could not get it. Therefore, Japan gave the required
two year notice that as o f December 31, 1936 it would no longer be a party to the
Washington Treaties and their limitations. Then on the 18th o f June, 1935 Britain and
Germany signed an agreement that the German Navy would not build beyond 35 percent of
the strength o f the Royal Navy. This was de facto permission for Germany to go beyond
the previous prohibitions o f the Treaty o f Versailles and thus rebuild its navy.*^ As Robert
Albion states.
The naval limitation movement started so hopefully at Washington in 192122 wound up with a fourth conference at London in 1935-36, which was
Hagan, This People's N aw . p. 266.
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little more than an Anglo-American “wake” for naval disarmament.
Germany had begun to rebuild her navy and Japan had already announced
her pending withdrawal from treaty agreements. Both the Americans and
British were thus faced with prospects o f two - ocean responsibilities.
The stage was set for World War H.

Naval Air Power and Worid War H
The advances o f the Japanese Empire in the 1930*s began to arouse concern in the
United States. Although the United States had whole heartedly embraced the war
renouncing Kellogg-Briand Pact and continued disarmament under the Quaker President
Herbert Hoover, Japanese actions in China and the Pacific began to create second thoughts
in the minds of many Americans. Even in the midst of the economic crisis of the Great
Depression, the government under President Franklin D. Roosevelt, began to recognize the
necessity of naval expansion to counter a potential threat from Japan.
The world had become a very different place after 1919. The Great War and its
aftermath changed the face o f Europe and the face o f war. War had become highly
mechanical and incredibly destructive. World War I showed that the submarine was an
effective weapon for commerce raiding as well as operations against fieet elements. In
addition, there was the realization that the airplane which had shown so much potential in
the skies over Europe could have consequences as an adjunct to conventional sea power.
Therefore, in order to command the sea, it has become important to exercise control over
the air. This was a lesson learned during World War n when it became apparent that
control o f the air meant control o f the land and sea. The ability to exercise control over
Robert G. Albion. Makers of Naval Policv 1789-1947 (Annapolis: Naval Institute
Press, 1980), p. 253.
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both the air and the sea are combined in the aircraft carrier. Thus, during the war in the
Pacific, the aircraft carrier surpassed the battleship as the most important ship in the fieet.
The aircraft carrier is a specific example of how technology infiuences naval policy
and international relations. The aircraft carrier is primarily a political instrument, and as
such, the aircraft carrier plays a central role as an instrument o f coercive diplomacy and
deterrence. Therefore, the carrier profoundly influenced naval policy in the second half of
the twentieth century. Because of their mission flexibility and great striking power, carriers
have been the central pillars of American naval policy during and after the Cold War.
Acceptance o f the mrplane and carrier as a naval weapon which would make
battleships obsolete was not immediate. After World War I, the United States was \rithout
any carriers. During the inter-war period, carriers and also submarines were viewed as
vessels which would act as a screen for the main battle wagons. With respect to airplanes,
conservative officers in the navy were skeptical about the effectiveness o f the new device
against armored battleships ^ven the contemporary state of aviation technology. T h ^
debated policy with emerging prophets of air power such as Billy Mitchell who had pushed
for a unified air command. Even naval exercises utilizing aircraft during the interwar
period were not enough to sway the minds of many policy makers as to the important role
the mrplane would make in future naval combat. It was not that they saw no role for naval
aviation, in fact many in the navy saw it as having value. Instead, it was a question of what
kind of ships the fleet would be centered on. Conservatives in the navy still believed that
the main strength of the fleet should be battleships. When Nfitchell’s planes sank the

OstfhesUmd during an exercise in 1921, the navy was angiy because Mitchell had
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effectively broken the rules of the exercise by sinking the ship, and therefore they gained no
information on bomb dam age/^ Referring to the future o f the battleship, Mitchell stated,
. . . a battleship .. . may cost from 50 to 70 million dollars. It has to be
protected by submarines, destroyers, cruisers, and aircraft, the total cost of
which is around 100 million dollars. . . I believe that a battleship today is a
useless element in the national defensive armament of the United States.
Suppose we had even one-half o f the cost of a battleship to use in the
development o f our aircraft and submarines."^
Mitchell made tWs statement while commenting on the crash o f the navy airship
U.S.S. Shenandoah. Mitchell criticized the army and navy for being negligent and paying
poor attention to aviation."' These public conunents resulted in his court-martial.

World War n
On the 7th o f December, 1941 the Imperial Japanese Navy attacked the US Naval
Base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. This attack was intended to eliminate American sea power
in the Pacific. The attack carried out by approximately 350 aircraft from six carriers
resulted in the sinking o f four battleships and serious damage to four others. It was a
surprise attack which proved once and for all that naval aircraft were capable of sinking
battleships. Luckily, the two American carriers which had been at Pearl earlier in the week
were at sea. As Kenneth Hagan states.
The carriers Lexington and Enterprise were safely at sea on 7 December
1941, delivering airplanes to Wake and Midway islands. Their survival,
coupled with the now proven efiBcacy of naval aviation, meant that the
aircraft carrier would almost immediately become the main American
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combatant of the surface war in the Pacific.*”
Had the two carriers been caught in Pearl Harbor, future operations against the
Japanese could have been more seriously hampered than they already were.
World War II in the Pacific was a carrier war. Without carriers available to project
air power forward of the reach of American airbases, it is doubtful that the United States
could have defeated Japan. The effect o f the carrier was revolutionary. The Battle o f the
Coral Sea, May 4-8, 1942, was the first naval battle in which the combatant ships never
saw one another. Although the battle resulted in the first real victory against Japan, the US
lost the carrier Lexington^ and Yorktawn was damaged. The victory was strategic for it
prevented the Japanese from assaulting the Allied base at Port Morseby, New Guinea and
slowed down their momentum.*^
The Battle o f Midway, June 3-6 1942, was probably the most important naval
battle o f the war. The carrier proved to be the most important and valuable vessel in the
battle. The Japanese had four carriers to the American’s three. The Japanese believed that
surprise was on their side, however, a squadron o f American torpedo bombers found the
Japanese fleet first. Although the torpedo bombers raid was unsuccessful, American dive
bombers caught the Japanese carriers rearming planes to strike ships instead of Midway
Island. In the ensuing battle, the Japanese lost four fleet carriers, the Hiryu, Akagi, Kaga,
and Soryu as well as the associated veteran aviators. The US lost only the Yorktown}*^
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The Battles o f the Coral Sea and Midway signified that the capital ship o f the future
was no longer the battleship but the aircraft carrier. The effect o f this fact after Midway
made the House Naval Affairs committee approve the construction o f 500,000 tons worth
of aircraft carriers and scrap plans to build ûve Montana class super dreadnoughts/^^
Recognized supremacy of the aircraft carrier over the battleship had come at last.
The United States Navy found itself the most powerful navy in the world after
World War n. It also found itself in the nuclear age. During the Cold War, the themes of
technology and international relations became inseparable. The unprecedented
destructiveness of nuclear weapons changed the relationship between technology and
international relations. Technology had been a tool o f international relations. Now
technology was capable of controlling international af&irs. The atomic bomb, and later the
hydrogen bomb dramatically affected the role of the navy in the post war world. Suddenly
the navy became involved with nuclear deterrence. As nuclear weapons improved and
shrank in size, it became possible for the new jet aircraft flying off carrier decks to carry a
nuclear weapon into Soviet territory if the need arose. The US Navy was now involved in
the high stakes strategy o f nuclear deterrence.

The Cold War
When World War n ended, attention turned to the Soriet Union. The Soviet
Union was a land power. At the end of World War II it did not have much of a navy.
What then, was the role o f the US Navy in relation to the Soviet Union? With no real
threat fi'om the Soviet Navy and no real advantage to be gained ùom guerre de course on
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Soviet shipping, the US Navy had to find a new role to play. It found one as an instrument
o f nuclear deterrence. The aircraft carrier, so important to American victory in the war,
became a platform for nuclear deterrence. The aircraft on board could be armed with
nuclear weapons. The navy could project power by threatening bases and installations on
the periphery o f the Soviet Union with nuclear attack.

This ability to threaten the Soviet

Union with nuclear attack fi'om the sea led the Soviet Union to place greater importance on
their own navy. This began a period of naval expansion on the part of the Soviet Union in
relation to the United States. In 1956, Admiral Sergei Gorschkov was given command of
the Soviet Navy, and served as Commander in Chief until his retirement in 1985.
Gorschkov transformed the Soviet Navy fi’om a coastal defense force into a blue water
navy which could rival the navy of the United States.

During his tenure, Gorschkov was

responsible for the modernization and growth of the Soviet Navy. Gorschkov eliminated
all pre-World War n ships, as well as ships taken as prizes firom the Axis countries. Then,
following the directives of the post-Stalinist government, Gorschkov oversaw the
development o f smaller missile armed ships and submarines which could counter the US
Navy which had gone through a period of re-expansion during the Korean War.’^^’ By the
1960's the Soviet Navy had expanded to the point where its ships were beginning to
maintain a global presence. Howarth points out that the growth of the Soviet Navy,
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bucked the pattern o f the past, having developed beyond the Soviet Union’s
natural geographical constraints. And it is notable that in this century only
one other navaï nation o f major significance has done that: namely,
Germany, under both the Kaiser and Hitler. Young and ambitious
(Germany was united into one nation only in 1871), it twice deliberately
created a war capable fleet; yet with a coastline far shorter than its land
fi-ontiers, this was in defiance o f its own geography. The Soviet Union,
united only in 1922, is [was] still a young country; it certainly has been
ambitious; and navally speaking, its geographical constraints are similar to
those o f Germany.****
The Soviet Navy, large by the end o f the 1980's, was striving to control the sea in
the same manner as the US Navy. By the beginning o f the 1990's with the demise of the
USSR imminent, the Soviet Navy had five tasks to carry out: it was to “participate in
strategic strike operations” with its SSBN force, “participate in defense o f the homeland”
by eliminating potential threats before they came within striking range o f the USSR,
“support operations o f other forces conducting strategic missions” through joint or
combined operations with other sea-air-land forces, “interdict lines of communication” by
preventing the resupply and reinforcement of NATO and allied forces in either Europe or
Asia, and “support state policy in peacetime” by showing the flag and supporting global
policy interests.*^’
Although the Soviet Union did not conform to Mahan’s six criteria for sea power,
Gorschkov’s reforms successfully produced a world class navy. The Soviet Navy under
Admiral Gorschkov is a perfect example of a continental power’s application of sea power.
The four functions of a continental navy described by Clark Reynolds are to defend against
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invasion, engage in combined operations with the army, commerce raiding, and sea denial
or deterrence. The Soviet Navy fulfilled all o f these roles.
Atomic bombs dropped from jets were not the only nuclear age advancement
involving the US Navy. In 1955, the USS Nautilus made its maiden voyage. The Nautilus
was the world’s first nuclear powered ship and demonstrated the feasibility of nuclear
power for naval vessels.*** Nuclear power was a revolutionary technological leap in
submarine technology. Nuclear propulsion combined with carbon dioxide scrubbers meant
that a submarine could remain submerged almost indefinitely. Its underwater endurance
was only limited by the endurance o f the crew. Effectively, this meant that Nautilus
became the first true submarine, as opposed to a surface boat which could submerge for
short durations. Nuclear power also eliminated the need for fuel stops, important since the
age o f steamships.
It was only a matter o f time before the limitless endurance of the nuclear-propelled
submarine was combined with the new technology o f the intercontinental ballistic missile.
In the 1960's the United States introduced its first Polaris missile boats. These submarines
carried sixteen Polaris ballistic missiles in vertical launch tubes.'*’ The Ballistic missile
submarine was bom, and the age of the "Boomer” began. Nuclear subs armed with ballistic
missiles gave the US Navy a tme nuclear deterrent capability and completed the stratège
nuclear triad o f missile submarines, ICBM’s, and nuclear armed bombers. The navy had a
weapon system which was stealthy, and carried immense firepower. With this new system
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the US had a credible second strike capability which made deterrence a credible strategy
for maintaining peace.
As American naval policy moved toward nuclear deterrence, the Soviet Union
responded by expanding its own navy. Rapid expansion o f the Soviet Navy under Admiral
Gorschkov alarmed policy makers in the United States. During the 1970's the concept of
the 600-ship navy emerged to counter the Soviet naval threat.
The US Navy was not just involved with nuclear deterrence during the last half of
the twentieth century. It proved to be o f immense value and importance during the wars
and proxy wars that the United States was involved with during the Cold War. American
aircraft carriers were the first to react when North Korea invaded South Korea, and proved
invaluable to America’s prosecution of that war. The navy’s support of the landings at
Inchon was also invaluable. The Korean conflict also saved naval aviation fi'om doom
because o f competition firom land based air power. It showed that aircraft carriers were of
utmost importance in projecting military power abroad in the post World War H world.
Vietnam happened to be a war in which the navy played an important role. Air
strikes took place fi'om carriers. Operation Game Warden utilized PBR’s (Patrol Boat
River) which patrolled the Mekong Delta in order to prevent the Viet Cong fi'om moving
men and supplies in the area.**^
The biggest change in naval policy in the past twenty years was the move toward
the 600-ship navy. As the United States began to fall behind the Soviet Navy due to

Hagan, This People’s N aw . p. 341.
Ibid., pp. 371-75.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

90
Admiral Ck)rschkov’s reforms, alarm began to spread in the US naval community.
Concerning this problem, Stephen Howarth says.
President Carter had expected that the study (Sea Plan 2000) would give
him a basis for naval reduction. Instead, it demonstrated that the Navy had
fallen behind the Soviet Navy and offered him four alternatives; First, do
nothing and let matters slip fiirther; second, build only enough to avoid
further slippage; third, build more to regain parity; or fourth, build a lot
more and regmn the lead. Carter found the first, second, and fourth options
unacceptable, and toward the end o f his term he began option three,
building more to regain parity. In 1981 the new President Reagan and his
Secretfuy o f the Navy, John Lehman, inherited Sea Plan 2000 and,
regarding the Carter choice as an absolute minimum, they easily decided to
go beyond it and take up option four.^”
By the mid 1980's the national maritime strategy predicated on a 600-ship navy
based on the following: “fifteen carrier battle groups, four battleship surface action groups
one hundred attack submarines, ballistic missile submarines, MAF-Plus-MAB assault
echelon lift, one hundred to one hundred ten frigates, thirty one mine countermeasures
ships, support ships to match.”**^ The goal for a 600-ship navy was nearly met. Although
the US Navy never ended up with 600 vessels, it had approximately 574 ships by 1990. Of
those 574 ships, 15 of them were attack carriers. It also had 100 attack submarines which
had been its goal.*^
With the end o f the Cold War, the role o f US naval power has turned fi'om nuclear
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deterrence to the projection o f conventional power. Because many American military bases
world wide have been shut down, the US Navy finds itself bearing more of the burden in
terms o f showing the flag. In many cases the only available air power comes from carriers
because land bases are either to far away or they no longer exist. Although the need for
nuclear deterrence remmns, American carrier groups have increasingly been called upon to
respond to threats in the Third World and other regions where US interests are at stake
particularly in the Middle East.
Sea Power Example: American Naval Operations in the Persian Gulf
American naval policy during the closing decades o f the twentieth century has been
increasingly oriented toward the projection o f power in the Middle East. This is especially
true o f the Persian Gulf. Increasingly, the United States has maintained a naval presence in
the Persian Gulf in order to provide stability and permit the uninterrupted flow of oil out of
the region. The Persian Gulf is one o f the most strate^cally important regions of the
world. It has been for centuries. In the past it was in the middle of the Silk Road and other
ancient trade routes to Asia and India. Today it is strategically important because o f the oil
resources which lie under the countries of the region. In contemporary times, because of
its strategic nature, the Persian Gulf has proven to be o f immense interest to western
powers. This was especially true o f the British during the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. The British needed control in the Gulf area to protect lines o f transport and
communication with India. For this reason, the Persian Gulf was a British Lake. However,
after the end o f World War II, in the process of decolonization, the British presence in the
region slowly diminished. In 1968, the British Government announced that it would
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withdraw all o f its forces east of the Suez Canal.*** When this occurred, the security
arrangements for the region changed. Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia emerged as the major
players. During the early 1970's, President Richard M. Nixon was concerned with security
in the region vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. At the time, he was not in a position to commit
forces there to keep an eye on things. The poUqr which emerged to fill the void left by the
British withdrawal was President Nixon’s “Twin Pillars” Policy. The Twin Pillars were
Iran under the Shah, and Saudi Arabia. These two nations would insure security and
stability in the Persian Gulf. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, alarm
bells went off in Washington. Because of the fear that the Soviet Union might use
Afghanistan as a staging point for operations against Iran and the Perâan Gulf, President
Carter issued the Carter Doctrine which promised US intervention in the region in order to
insure stability, and he also pledged to create a Rapid Deployment Force.***
1979 was not a good year for American interests in the Persian Gulf. In January,
Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi was forced out o f power and the nation of Iran fell into
anarchy. One of Nixon’s “Twin Pillars” had crumbled. Iranian “students” stormed the US
embassy in November, 1979, and held American hostages for 444 days. A power vacuum
suddenly existed in the Gulf, and Iraq stepped in to fill the void.
On the 22nd o f September, 1980, a fifty-thousand strong Iraqi army attacked four
strateg ic junctions along the Iraq-Iran border, signaling the beginning of an eight year long
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blood bath.*^^ Saddam Hussein’s goal was to take advantage o f the anarchy in Iran to gain
possession of the Shatt al-Arab, a waterway to the Persian Gulf. What resulted was a
galvanization o f the Iranian people and a long, drawn out war wWch ended with the status
quo antd)ellum. The war dragged on until the negotiation o f a cease fire in mid- summer
1988.
This war, in a strategically important region of the world, would require the United
States Navy to increase its presence in and around the Persian Gulf. The year 1987 would
prove to be a particularly eventful year for the United States Navy in the Persian Gulf.
Repeated attacks by Iranian speedboats upon shipping in the Gulf resulted in a request by
Kuwait to the United States to allow its tankers to be reflagged and escorted by US Navy
vessels. 1987 would also see reprisal attacks upon Pasadran bases on oil platforms and the
tragic missile attack on the USS Stark by an Iraqi plane.
The Tanker War began in 1981 with Iraqi attacks on shipping going to and from
Iranian ports in the Northern Persian Gulf. The Iranians would not contribute to the
Tanker War until 1984. The purpose of these attacks on shipping is one o f the oldest in
naval warfare. It is intended to disrupt the trade of the enemy nation. It is economic
warfare. Iraq relied primarily on land based aircraft and missiles as instruments of seacontrol. Iraq did not have a very large navy, and what large vessels it did have were put
into mothballs in Italy. Iran on the other hand had a fairly sizeable naval force in the
region. However, most of the attacks on shipping carried out by the Iranian forces in the
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Gulf were not carried out by ships o f the Iranian Navy. Rather, the attacks were carried
out by the Pasdarcm^ irregular troops loyal to the Revolution. They carried out the attacks
using speedboats o f Swedish or American manufacture. These speedboats were lightly
armed. Usually they carried only a couple o f light machine guns and rocket propelled
grenades. These speedboats were only really capable o f damaging a supertanker rather
than sinking one.
The Tanker War was not limited to tankers fl>ing the flags o f the belligerent parties.
Like the unrestricted submarine warfare carried out by German U-Boats during the world
wars, the shipping of other nations which traded with Iran and Iraq became fair game.
From an economic standpoint, the Tanker War did not pose a tremendous threat to Iraq.
Iraq transported most o f its crude oil by pipeline. However, both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait
backed Iraq and were heavily dependent upon tankers to export their oil. These ships were
attacked along with the ships o f other nations, including Liberia, the United Kingdom, the
Soviet Union, and Japan. Nevertheless, tankers continued to fill up in all the nations
surrounding the Persian Gulf, and the oU continued to flow out without an appreciable rise
in price despite the threat the belligerents posed. It was amidst this Tanker War where the
United States Navy became prominently involved.
With respect to Iranian operations in the Persian Gulf, the preferred instrument of
the Pasdaran for attacking fi^eighters is the speedboat. Utilizing machine guns and rocket
propelled grenades, the Pasdaran used hit and run tactics to damage ships. These
speedboats used five oil drilling platforms as bases for operations. On October 19th, 1987
the US Navy responded to a mine which had damaged the fiigate Samuel B. Roberts.
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Navy vessels attacked two platforms and destroyed them with over 1000 rounds o f fiveinch ammunition. However, even with such a reprisal, speedboat attacks on shipping
continued.
In late 1986, Kuwut petitioned the United States to reflag its tankers and provide
escort for them. At the same time, the Soviet Union offered Kuwait the same thing and
also offered to charter Soviet tankers instead if necessary. O f eleven tankers, the Kuwaitis
decided that they would reflag six as US and five as Soviet. The United States, alarmed at
the prospect of growing Soviet influence in the Gulf, told Kuwait in March of 1987 that it
would be willing to reflag all eleven tankers as A m e r i c a n . T h e first tanker escort
occurred in July o f 1987. Disaster occurred as the tanker SS Bridgeton struck a mine laid
by the Iranians. However, even with this initial setback, the convoys went on.
Iranian mines would prove to be a thorn in the ade for the US Navy. Iran began
laying mines in the Gulf. Most of the ships deployed to the Gulf by the US were not
prepared to deal with mines. The only asset immediately available to the US Navy were
helicopters flown off*o f amphibious warfare ships. The United States had difficulty
deploying its own minesweepers to the Gulf, and so it would have to rely on minesweepers
fi’om allied nations. The United States had one major success in the war on mines. On the
21st o f September, 1987 US Army Special operations helicopters operating off a Navy
fiigate captured the Iran Ajr^ an Iranian landing craft which was being used surreptitiously

Wesely L. McDonald, “The Convoy Mission,” Proceedings (The US Naval Institute,
May, 1988), pp. 36-37.
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to lay mines.^*®
Mines and speedboats were not the only concern facing the US Navy with regards
to Iranian aggression. The Iranians had procured Chinese-made Silkworm anti-ship
missiles which could be fired from shore installations. These missiles had the capability of
not just damaging, but o f sinking ships. On the 15th of October, 1987 Iran fired a
Silkworm missile from the Fao Peninsula at the Sungari, a US owned and Liberian-flagged
tanker lying at anchor nine miles off Kuwait. This resulted in damage to the ship but no
casualties. The next day, another Silkworm hit the reflagged Kuwaiti tanker Sea Isle City.
This resulted in damage to the ship and eighteen injured crewmen.*** The Silkworm
presented a dangerous threat to international navigation of the Persian Gulf. Using mines
and Silkworms, Iran threatened to close the Strait o f Hormuz . However, the United
States made it clear that such an action would result in massive reprisal. A carrier battle
group was stationed just outside the Gulf in the Arabian Sea to act just in case such an
incident occurred. The Iranians however, were not the only ones to damage ships with
anti-ship missiles.
On the 17th o f May, 1987 the US fiigate, USS Stark was struck by two Exocet
missiles fired firom an Iraqi Mirage FI aircraft. The attack left thirty-seven Americans
dead.*^* This attack was a mistake. At the time, Iraq was our aUy and so it would have

*” Ronald O’Rourke, “The Tanker War,” Proceedings. (The US Naval Institute, May,
1988), p. 33.
***Ibid., p. 33.
*®*lÆchael Vlahos, “The Stark Report,” Proceedings. ( The US Naval Institute, May,
1988), p. 64.
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been difficult to justify a reprisal. The investigation concluded that the pilot o f the Iraqi
aircraft mistook the Stark for a freighter on its radar. Mistakes were also made on the part
o f the Stark's crew. Although warned about the presence of the Iraqi plane by an AWACS
plane, the crew fmled to take recognize the possible threat. Also there was some question
as to whether or not the sensors on board the Stark were able to give a timely warning
before the incoming Exocet missiles struck.

The missiles were spotted visually by

lookouts, which meant that there was no time for warning. The Stark was also supposed to
be operating in Condition-m which means that all sensors and weapons stations were to be
manned.

However, the Stark did not have its chafT launchers on, nor was its Phalanx

CIWS (Close in Weapons System) turned on.*** These were meant to protect it incase of a
missile attack. The Stark took two missiles, of which the warhead o f the first missile was a
dud. However, the crew did a fantastic job with damage control and the ship survived.
The Stark incident was not the only tragedy to involve the US Navy during
operations in the Persian Gulf. On the 3rd o f July, 1988 the USS Vincinms shot down an
Iran Air passenger jet over the waters o f the Persian Gulf. This tragic accident claimed the
lives o f 224 adults and 66 children. It was the sixth worst air disaster in history.***
All told, the Tanker War resulted in a total of 451 attacks on ships by the
belligerents fi’om 1981 through 1987. O f these attacks, 283 were perpetrated by Iraq and

**^ Ibid., p. 66.
***Ibid.
*** Ibid.
*** Sandra Mackey, The Iranians: Persia. Islam, and the Soul of a Nation. (New York:
Penguin Putnam, 1996), p. 331.
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168 were perpetrated by Iran.*“ The total number o f people killed in these attacks from
1984 through 1987 was 116.*^^ Ships attacked included oil tankers, cargo freighters, and
tug boats. Anything that could carry some kind o f good was attacked.
The US naval presence in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War existed for
several reasons. Soviet activity in Afghanistan and a revolutionary Iran posed one threat to
stability. The potential threat to the flow of oil to the rest o f the world posed another
threat to stability. The United States Navy played the role o f deterrent and crossing guard
during the war. Its object as a deterrent was to place a check on possible Soviet expansion
into the region by maintaining a visible presence. It also functioned as a deterrent to
closure o f the Gulf by one of the belligerents, especially Iran. And o f course it acted as a
crossing guard by escorting tankers and assisting ships in distress.
The United States was far from the only nation to maintain a military presence in
the Gulf for the same reasons. NATO members, especially France and Britain maintained
sizeable numbers of assets in the Gulf. Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands all contributed
some assets. The Soviet Union did as well. Policing the Persian Gulfin the midst o f one of
the longest and bloodiest conflicts was an international task.
The Iran-Iraq war has been over for ten years now. The Soviet Union has collapsed
and is no longer a direct threat to the regions* stability. Yet the United States continues to
maintain a strong naval presence in the Gulf. Military success in the Persian Gulf War of
1990-1991 depended on the US Navy. The navy served several important functions. It

O’Rourke, “The Tanker War,” p. 31.
’«’ Ibid., p. 32
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provided sea-lift capabilities, moving troops and heavy equipment to the theater of
operations. Without this logistical capability, the United States would have been unable to
prosecute the war. It committed six carrier battle groups to the region, fired approximately
300 Tomahawk missiles, and flew 4,700 aircraft sorties in the first thirteen days o f the war.
The navy destroyed oil platforms being used as SAM sites, and the battleships Aff&rowrf
and Wisconsin were involved in shore bombardment off*the coast o f Kuwait. The US
Navy also kept its ships stationed in the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf
effectively surrounding Iraq on three sides.
The aftermath of the war left Saddam Hussein still in power. He is still the biggest
threat to the security of the region. Although he lost the war and has been subject to
United Nations sanctions and inspections, he continues to be a threat. The United States
Navy along with other US forces maintain a presence in order to deter Hussein fi-om
further aggression and to coerce him, by force if necessary, to comply with United Nations
inspections. As we have seen over the course of the past several years, Saddam Hussein
frequently stands up to the United States and United Nations and at the last minute, when
the use of force is imminent, he backs down. The US Navy has been and will continue to
be an integral part o f the forces keeping Iraq in check.
The presence o f the US Navy in the Persian Gulf will probably continue into the
twenty-first century as long as the region continues to remain unstable. Iraq continues as
an adversary while the United States seeks to improve relations with Iran. What changes
the future will bring in terms of balance o f power and stability remain to be seen; but as
168
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long as the Persian Gulf, and indeed the entire Middle East remain strategically important
and the threat o f conflicts continue to loom, the US Navy will need to be capable of
responding to any crisis.
The Future of the US Navy
The twenty first century will challenge American naval policy in new ways. As low
intensity conflicts, humanitarian intervention, and anti-terrorist activities increasingly
involve the United States, the navy must have the flexibility to meet the new challenges. It
is quite unlikely that we will ever again see large scale naval actions on the high seas.
Navies are expensive to build and maintain. Only a few nations in the world have the need
and the resources to maintain large navies. Technology is rapidly rendering sea-keeping
navies as we know them obsolete. This does not mean that navies will be irrelevant. Quite
the contrary, navies will still be important for power projection if a nation wishes to wield
global influence. It is their size, composition, and missions which will change.
The US Navy’s mission in the post Cold War world is shifting fi-om open ocean
operations and warfare to operations in the littoral, or coastal regions. The last action
fought by the US Navy against another fleet was Leyte Gulf.*®’ With the demise o f the
Soviet Union, there is no navy left in the world to challenge the US Navy on the high seas.
The conflicts o f the past fifty years involving American naval power have taken place near
the coast. Given this trend it is safe to assume that it ^

continue. The American navy has

begun to reflect the shift fiom control of the high seas to control o f the littoral regions.
This shift in direction fiom the Cold War strategy of control of the high seas to
169
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operations in the littoral is part o f the post - Cold War military strategy. In his article,
“U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead,” published in the Winter 1992/93 issue of Foreign Affairs.
Gen. Colin Powell writes.
The new national military strategy is an unclassified document. Anyone can
read it. It is short, to the point and unambiguous. The central idea in the
strategy is the change from a focus on global war-fighting to a focus on
regional contingencies. No communist hordes threaten western Europe
today and, by extension, the rest o f the fi’ee world. So our new strategy
emphasizes being able to deal with individual crises without their escalating
to ^obal or thermonuclear war.*™
For the navy this new strategy which places greater emphasis on joint and
combined operations was publicly articulated in the Navy and Marine Corps White Paper

From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Servicefo r the 21** Century. This paper describes the
new shift in naval policy fi-om high seas operations to operations n the littoral. It states:
Our ability to command the seas in areas where we anticipate future
operations allows us to resize our naval forces and to concentrate more on
capabilities required in the complex operating environment o f the “littoral”
or coastlines of the earth. With the demise o f the Soviet Union, the fi-ee
nations o f the world claim preeminent control o f the seas and ensure
fi'eedom o f commercial maritime passage. As a result, our national maritime
policies can afford to de-emphasize efforts in some naval warfare areas. But
the challenge is much more complex than simply reducing our present naval
forces. We must structure a fundamentally different naval force to respond
to strategic demand, and that new force must be sufiSciently flexible and
powerful to satisfy enduring national security requirements.
It goes on to say:
This strategic direction, derived fi-om the National Security Strategy,
represents a fundamental shift away fi-om open ocean warfighting on the sea
toward joint operations conducted fi-om the sea. The navy and marine corps
will now respond to crises and can provide the initial, “enabling” capability

*™Colin Powell, “U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead,” Foreign Affairs (Council on Foreign
Relations, Winter 1992/93), p. 35.
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for joint operations in conflict - - as well as continued participation in any
sustained efifort. We will be part o f a “s e a -a ir-la n d ” team trained to
respond immediately to the Unified Commanders as they execute national
policy.*’*
As cruise missiles become cheaper and more accurate, it is probable that policy
makers will choose to change the composition o f the navy by moving away fi'om many
types of surface ships and increasingly build more submarines. The submarine and the
cruise missile are to the twenty-first century what the aircraft carrier and the airplane were
to the twentieth century. The carrier will not disappear from the seas. It will remain an
integral and important part o f the fleet. However, its dominance compared to other vessels
will probably be reduced. The carrier is beginning to approach senility. It is still capable o f
carrying out its mission, but at an increasingly expensive cost relative to newer and cheaper
technologies which are equally or more effective, such as the submarine and cruise missile
combination.*’^ For example, although it can launch cruise missiles through its torpedo
tubes, the 688i class attack submarines are equipped with twelve vertical launch tubes
specifically intended for the Tomahawk cruise missile. Tins allows the submarine to carry a
full compliment o f torpedoes, anti-ship missiles, and mines, and still attack a dozen targets
with cruise missiles. It is this flexibility which makes the submarine a very effective and
versatile weapons platform.*’^ In addition, it is possible that the proposed “arsenal ship”

*’* ...From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Servicefo r the 27" Century.
www.chinfo.navy.mil/navypalib/policy/fi'omsea/fi-omsea.txt p.2
*’^ George and Meredith Friedman, The Future o f War: Power. Technology, and American
World Dominance in the 21" Centurv (New York: Crown Publishers Inc., 1996), pp. 395-411,
*’^ Tom Clancy, Submarine: A Guided Tour Inside a nuclear Warship (New York: Berkley
Books, 1993), pp. 98-134.
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carrying an array o f 500 - 750 cruise, anti-ship, anti-sub, and anti-air missiles will play a
critical role in force planning and strategy, particularly with respect to operations in littoral
regions. Proliferation o f advanced precision guided munitions will make it increasingly
difficult for traditional methods o f naval power projection to be effective.
There is another important variable besides raw technological improvement that
needs to be considered with respect to future naval policy. That variable is public opinion.
The Persian Gulf Conflict o f 1991 brought the immediate effects of war into our homes via
CNN. The American public was awestruck by the incredible accuracy shown by gun
camera footage as bunkers and bridges were systematically destroyed. The war had a
sanitary, almost unreal and even entertaining appearance.*^^ Over the course of the decade,
technology has steadily improved, and the instant availability of information to the public
through television, the radio, and the Internet has established conditions that are new.
Historically, the media have had an effect on public opinion regarding war and
peace. However, what is new is the speed with which the information arrives to the public
at large and the speed w th which they can make their opinions felt. The speed and scope
o f information dissemination does not just affect domestic opinion, but also international
opinion. As markets and information systems globalize, people all over the world receive
nearly up-to-the-minute information on global events. Therefore, policy makers are faced
with a new quandary. How does a policy maker make decisions effectively when flooded
with public demands? In most circumstances it is probably safe to say that a policy maker

Friedman and Friedman, The Future o f War, pp. 395-411
Howarth, To Shining Sea, p. 564.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

104
is in a more informed position in a holistic sense than the average member o f the public at
Iwge. Because we live in a society in which the policy makers are ultimately responsible to
the public, how does someone in a position o f responsibility make and execute a sound
decision with instant public pressure to do one thing or another? This question, the rapid
dissemination o f information, and its effect on public opinion in the United States certainly
will affect naval policy in the future.

Summary
The theme o f international relations played an important role in twentieth century
American naval poliQf. The United States emerged from political isolationism to
participate in two world wars. Following World War H, America became one o f two
superpowers exercising world-wide influence. The end of the Cold War left the United
States as the only remaining superpower. Throughout the twentieth century, the navy was
integral to the projection o f American power and influence.
The twentieth century also brought unparalleled technological change. Naval
aviation, the submarine, nuclear weapons, and strategic missiles all revolutionized maritime
warfare. These new technologies allowed the United States Navy to project unprecedented
strategic power. The navy is no longer limited by the range and power o f its guns.
Submarine-launched, ballistic missiles can strike deep into the heart o f a continent from
mid-ocean. Aircraft like the F/A 18 Hornet and the Tomahawk cruise missiles allow the
navy to project power hundreds of miles, and strike targets with unparalleled precision.
Today, there are few places on Earth which cannot be touched by the US Navy.
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Chapter V: Conclusion
This thesis examined the development o f American naval policy in relation to the
four themes o f technology, economic change, domestic politics, and international relations.
In chapter one, we examined the concept of sea power and command o f the sea introducing
the ideas o f Captain A T. Mahan and his six criteria for sea power. Chapter two covered
naval policy during the years o f the Early Republic, concentrating on the relationship
between policy and domestic politics and international relations. Chapter three discussed
naval policy in the context of the industrial revolution and the nineteenth century. It
focused primarily on the relationship between technology and policy as well as economic
change and policy. The fourth chapter examined naval policy from the beginning of the
twentieth century to the present. Naval policy was discussed in relation to all four themes,
but most importantly technology and the change in America’s world position.
As we enter the twenty*first century, the nature o f naval power and sea control is
changing. The end o f the Cold War has made the US Navy undisputed master of the seas.
With the exception o f a few regional conflicts, the world is basically at peace. There is no
looming conflict between any o f the world’s great powers. We have entered the age of the

Pax Americana. Given the prevalence o f peace, is it necessary for the United States to
maintain a presence on all o f the world’s oceans? I would argue that it is imperative.
Although the world is generally at peace, regional conflicts and unrest threaten United
States interests all over the globe. The navy is in many cases the most visible
representative o f those interests. The presence o f a carrier group off shore can be an
incentive for a potentially rogue re^m e to control its behavior. If necessary, the navy can
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launch an immediate military response with cruise missile strikes, air strikes, or by landing
Marines ashore. Maintenance o f a strong navy is crucial to continuing the Pax Americana.
Another question that must be asked is whether Mahan’s six criteria for sea power
still relevant in light o f modem realities? I would argue that they are. The importance o f
sea control has not changed, and therefore Mahan’s six criteria o f sea power (geographical
position, physical conformation, extent of territory, population, character o f the people,
and character o f the government) still hold validity.
Geographical position retains relevancy to the present. The United States is
situated on two great oceans over which billions o f dollars worth of commerce annually
flows. This position requires the United States to maintain a naval presence in both oceans.
In Mahan’s time, the Atlantic Ocean carried the bulk o f international commerce, and
therfore it was the most economically important ocean. Today, with the economic
prosperity that has taken hold in the countries o f the Pacific Rim, the Pacific Ocean carries
as much, if not more trafiBc than the Atlantic. Because the United States borders both
oceans, it is in a geographical position to control both, which it does.
Physical conformation remains relevant today. America is blessed with excellent
harbors on both oceans. It produces both agricultural and industrial surpluses for sale
abroad. The extent o f coastline on both oceans, along with excellent harbor facilities,
allows the United States to be a center of international trade.
The extent o f territory relative to population is the third geographical criterion for
sea power. America has a population large enough to take suitable advantage of, and
defend the coastal facilities. Therefore, the extent of the coastline relative to our large
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population gives us a source of strength for we have the population resource to defend it.
In reality though, this criteria has diminished in importance since Mahan's time. The
advent o f long range weaponry, aircraft, and precision guided munitions allows a nation
with a smaller population relative to its coastline to defend it more successfully today than
one hundred years ago.
The population of the United States is sufficient for maintaining a strong navy and
supporting American maritime industries and interests. This is a period of unparalleled
national prosperity, and the tax revenue flowing into government coffers allows the country
to support an expensive and technologically advanced navy. Young people exiting high
school who either cannot afford college or are undecided provide a resource of potential
naval personnel. The modern navy provides training and experience which can be
practically applied to civilian life.
The character of the American people is generally commerce minded. American
workers have an important stake in exporting goods abroad. The success of e-commerce
on the Internet, and the globalization o f the economy is providing thousands o f new jobs.
This along vdth the ability to receive information about the rest of the world nearly
instantaneously is giving the American people greater international awareness. The people
of the United States increasingly have a stake in international events which effect them now
more than ever.
The character of the government is one that encourages international commerce.
That the United States is a member o f the World Trade Organization and has entered into
the North American Free Trade Agreement with Canada and Mexico is a testament to this
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fact. The United States government has interests which are global. In many cases they are
economic, and in some cases they are humanitarian. The character o f the government is
such that it is necessary to maintain a navy to help preserve its interest in international
commerce and world events.
Mahan’s six criteria are still valid in today’s world. It is imperative that the United
States continues to maintain a strong navy to support its interests and be a stabilizing
influence in the world. Without a strong navy, America could easily lose its influence and
position in the world. If we view this country as a force for moral good and a beacon of
hope for the world, it is necessary to have the best navy in the world.
American naval policy has had a long development over the past two hundred and
ten years. The progression from the era o f solid shot to the era o f Tomahawk involved
considerable change. Policy has changed with the character and interests of the nation.
The United States has progressed from a small, isolationist, agrarian nation with a relatively
weak navy, to a large, globally involved, post-industrial nation with the most powerful navy
the world has ever seen. Gen. Colin Powell stated.
No other nation on earth has the power we possess. More important, no
other nation on earth has the trusted power we possess. We are obligated
to lead. If the free world is to harvest the hope and fulfill the promise that
our great victory in the Cold War has offered us, America must shoulder the
responsibility of its power, the last best hope of earth has no other choice.
We must lead.
We cannot lead without our armed forces. Economic power is essential;
political and diplomatic skills are needed; the power o f our beliefs and our
values is fundamental to any success we might achieve; but the presence of
our arms to buttress these other elements of our power is as critical to us as
the freedom we so adore. Our arms must be second to none.*’*
176
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Our navy is presently second to none and will remain that way for the foreseeable
future. Following Gen. Powell’s statement, we must not allow our navy to decline to a
point where it can no longer perform its missions. In closing, it is important to keep in
mind the argument of the Navy League of the United States. In November 1914, they
issued a release titled “How to Keep World Peace.” It simply stated:
An Easy Solution For Securing Peace on Earth Recommended by the Navy
League to Well Endowed Pacifists.
Abolish: Kings, Oligarchs, Race Antipathies, Unfair Competition, Land
Grabbing, Injustice, and Sin.
Establish: The Rule o f the People, A Satisfactory World Tribunal, Justice,
Charity, and A Changed Human Nature.
Ad Interim: MAINTAIN A STRONG NAVY.*”

*” “How to Keep World Peace,” as cited in Armin Rappaport, The N aw League of the
TTnited States (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1962), pp. 44-45.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

no
Bibliography

Books:
Abbot, Willis J. The Naval History o f the United States. New York: Dodd, Mead, and
Company, 1896.
Albion, Robert G. Forests and Sea Power: The Timber Problem of the Roval N aw 1652 1862. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926.
Albion, Robert G. Makers of Naval Policv 1789-1947. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press,
1980.
Albion, Robert G. & Pope, Jennie B Sea Lanes in War Time: The American Experience
1775-1945. Second Ed. City Unknown: Archon Books, 1968.
Baer, George W. One Hundred Years o f Sea Power: The U.S. N aw . 1890-1990. Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1994.
Baxter, James P. The Introduction of the Ironclad Warship. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1933.
Bennet, Frank M. The Steam Navy o f the United States. Westport: The Greenwood Press,
1972.
Brodie, Bernard. Sea Power in the Machine Age. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1941.
Carter, Samuel. The Incredible Great White Fleet: America Comes o f Age as a World
Power. New York: Crowell-Collier Press, 1971.
Campbell, Charles S. The Transformation o f American Foreign Relations: 1865-1900. New
York: Harper & Row, 1976.
Clancy, Tom. Submarine: A Guided Tour Inside a Nuclear Warship. New York: Berkley
Books, 1993.
Cooney, David M. A Chronologv of the U.S. N aw . New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1965.
Davis, Burke. The Billv Mitchell Affair. New York: Random House, 1967.
Davis, George T. A N aw Second to None: The Development of Modem American Naval
Policv. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1940.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

110
Bibliography

Books:
Abbot, Willis J. The Naval History o f the United States. New York; Dodd, Mead, and
Company, 1896.
Albion, Robert G. Forests and Sea Power: The Timber Problem of the Roval N aw 1652 1862. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926.
Albion, Robert G. Makers of Naval Policv 1789-1947. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press,
1980.
Albion, Robert G. & Pope, Jennie B. Sea Lanes in War Time: The American Experience
1775-1945. Second Ed. City Unknown: Archon Books, 1968.
Baer, George W. One Hundred Years o f Sea Power: The U.S. N aw . 1890-1990. Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1994.
Baxter, James P. The Introduction of the Ironclad Warship. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1933.
Bennet, Frank M. The Steam N aw o f the United States. Westport: The Greenwood Press,
1972.
Brodie, Bernard. Sea Power in the Machine Age. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1941.
Carter, Samuel. The Incredible Great White Fleet: America Comes o f Age as a World
Power. New York: Crowell-Collier Press, 1971.
Campbell, Charles S. The Transformation o f American Foreign Relations: 1865-1900. New
York: Harper & Row, 1976.
Clancy, Tom. Submarine: A Guided Tour Inside a Nuclear Warship. New York: Berkley
Books, 1993.
Cooney, David M. A Chronology of the U.S. N aw . New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1965.
Davis, Burke. The Billv Mitchell Affair. New York: Random House, 1967.
Davis, George T. A N aw Second to None: The Development o f Modem American Naval
Policv. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1940.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Ill
Deiüinger, Sutherland & Gary, Charles B War in the Pacific: A Study of Navies. Peoples.
and Battle Problems. New York: Robert M. McBride & Company, 1936.
Earle, Edward Mead, (ed.) Makers o f Modem Strategy: Military Thought from
Machiavelli to Hitler. Princeton: Princeton university Press, 1944.
Friedman, George and Meredith. The Future o f War: Power. Technology, and American
World Dominance in the 21* Centurv. New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1996.
Gardiner, C. Harvey. Naval Power in the Conquest of M ^ c o . Austin: University o f Texas
Press, 1956.
Gardner, Lloyd C. Imperial America: American Foreign Policv Since 1898. New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Inc., 1976.
George, James L. (ed.) Problems of Sea Power as We Approach the Twentv-First Century.
Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978.
Goldschmidt, Arthur Jr. A Concise History of the Middle East. Fifth Ed. Boulder:
Westview Press, 1996.
Hagan, Kenneth J. American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old N aw 1877 - 1889.
Westport: Greenwood Press, 1973.
Hagan, Kenneth J. This People’s Naw: The Making of American Sea Power. New York:
The Free Press, 1991.
Herrick, Walter R. Jr. The American Naval devolution. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1966.
Hooper, Edwin B. United States Naval Power in a Changing World. New York: Praeger,
1988.
Howarth, Stephen. To Shining Sea: A History of the United States N aw 1775-1998.
Norman-.The University o f Oklahoma Press, 1999.
Kramnick, Isaac, (ed.) James Madison. Alexander Hamilton, and John Jav - The Federalist
Papers. London: Penguin Books, 1987.
Kennedy, Paul M. The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery. New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1976.
Luttwak, Edward N. The Political Uses o f Sea Power. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

112
University Press, 1974.
Livezey, William E. Mahan on Sea Power. Norman: University o f Oklahoma Press, 1981.
Love, Robert W. Jr. History of the U. S. Naw: Volume One 1775-1941. 2Vols.
Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1992.
Mackey, Sandra. The Iranians: Persia. Islam, and the Soul of a Nation. New York: Penguin
Putnum, 1996.
Maclay, Edgar S. A History of the United States Navy from 1775-1894. Volumes I & H.
New York: D Appleton and Company, 1895.
Mahan, Alfred T. The Influence o f Sea Power upon History. 1660- 1783. Boston: Little,
Browp, and Company, 1894.
Massie, Robert K. Dreadnought: Britain. Germany, and the Coming of the Great War. New
York: Random House, 1991.
McGruther, Kenneth R The Evolving Soviet Naw. Newport: Naval War College Press,
1978.
Millet, Allan R. and Maslowski, Peter. For The Common Defense: A Military History o f
the United States of America. New York: The Free Press, 1994.
Mitchell, Donald W. History of the Modem American Navy: From 1883 through Pearl
Harbor. New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1946.
Modelski, George and Thompson, William R. Sea Power in Global Politics 1494 - 1993.
Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988.
Morgan, John S. Robert Fulton. New York: Mason/Charter, 1977.
Morison, Samuel E. "Old Bruin” Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry 1794-1858.
Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1967.
Morison, Samuel E., Commager, Henry S., and Leuchtenburg, William E. The Growth of
th e A m erican R ep u b lic. Volume I. New York: Oxford University Press, 1980.
Nathan, James A. and Oliver, James K. The Future o f United States Naval Power.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1979.
O’Conner, Raymond G. Origins of the American Naw: Sea Power in the Colonies and the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

113
New Nation. Laham: University Press o f America, 1994.
O’Gara, Gordon. Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of the Modem N aw . New York:
Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1969.
Paret, Peter (ed.) M ^ r s o f Modern Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.
Paulin, Charles Oscar. Paulin’s History o f Naval Administration 1775-1911: A Collection
o f Articles from the U.S. Naval Institue Proceedings. Annapolis: U.S. Naval
Institute, 1968.
Potter, E.B. (ed.) The United States and World Sea Power. Englewood Cliffs: PrenticeHaU, Inc., 1955.
Potter, E.B. & Nimitz, C. A. (eds.) Sea Power: A Naval lEstory. Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960.
Rappaport, Armin. The N aw League of the United States. Detroit: Wayne State
University Press, 1962.
Reynolds, Clark G. Command of the Sea. New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc.,
1974.
Richmond, Herbert. Statesmen and Sea Power. Westport: Greenwood Press, Publishers,
1974.
Roskill, Stephen. Naval Policies Between the Wars: Volume I - The Period of Anglo American Antagonism 1919 - 1929. London: Collins, 1968.
Shulman, Mark Russell. Navalism and the Emergence of American Sea Power 1882-1893.
Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995.
Smelser, Marshal. The Congress Founds the N aw 1787-1798. Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1959.
Smith, Myron J., Jr. The American N aw 1789-1860. Metuchen: The Scarecrow
Inc., 1974.

Press,

Sprout, Harold and Margaret (ed.) Foundations o f National Power: Readings on World
Politics and American Security. Princeton: Princeton Umversity Press, 1945.
Sprout, Harold and Margaret. The Rise of American Naval Power 1776 - 1918. Princeton:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

114
Princeton University Press, 1944.
Sprout, Harold and Margaret. Toward a New Order o f Sea Power: American Naval Policv
and the World Scene. 1918 - 1922 Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943.
Symonds, Craig L. Navalists and Antinavalists: The Naval Policv Debate in the United
States. 1785-1827. Cranbuiy: Associated University Presses, Inc., 1980.
Westcott, Allan Ed. American Sea Power Since 1775. Chicago: J.B. Lippincott Company,
1947.
Articles:
McDonald, Wesely L. “The Convoy Mission.” Proceedings. The US Naval
Institute.(May, 1988)
Nelson, William H. USN. “Peace Keepers at Risk.” Proceedings. The US Naval
Institute. (July, 1987).
O’Rourke, Ronald. “The Tanker War.” Proceedings. The US Naval Institute. (May, 1988)
Powell, Colin. “U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead.” Foreign Affairs ( Council on Foreign
Relations, Winter 1992/93)
Vlahos, Michael. “The Stark Report”. Proceedings. The US Naval Institute. (May,
1988)

Government Documents:
Annals of the Congress o f the United States. Third Congress 1793-1795. Washington:
Gales and Seaton, 1849.
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Understanding Soviet Naval Developments 6^
Edition, July 1991. (Washington: Department of the Navy, 1991)
From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21* Centurv.
www.chinfo.navy.mil/navypalib/policy/fi'omsea.txt.
[H.A.S.C. No. 99-33] The 600-Ship N aw and the Maritime Strategy: Hearings before the
Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the
Committee on Armed Services House o f Representatives Ninetv-Ninth Congress

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

115
First Session June 24. September 5. 6. and 10.1985 (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1986)
Palmer, Michael A. The N aw : The Transoceanic Period. 1945-1992.
www.history.navy.mil/history/history4.htm May, 1999.
Chapter 'XQ.-An Act to provide a Naval Armament March 27, 1794 The Public Statutes at
Large o f the United States of America Volume L Richard Peters, Esq., Ed. Boston:
Charles C. Little and James Browm, 1848.
The United Stats Naval Academv: A Brief History.
www.usna.edu/VirtualTour/150years/briefhis.htm March, 2000.
Treaties and Other International Agreements o f the United States o f America 1776-1949^.
Volume 6. Canada Czechoslovakia. Charles I. Bevans, LL.B Compiler.,
Washington: Department of State Publication 8549, 1971.
Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America1276-19.49^
Volume 12. United Kingdom-Zanzibar. Charles I. Bevans, LL.B Compiler.,
Washington: Department of State Publication 8761, 1974.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

